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 1 Introduction
One of the most important social programs for the rapidly growing elderly population
is Medicare, which provides nearly universal health insurance to individuals that are 65 or
older. In 2005, Medicare had 42.5 million beneﬁciaries and $330 billion of expenditures.1
Prior to receiving Medicare at age 65, many individuals receive health insurance only if they
continue to work. At age 65, however, Medicare provides health insurance to almost everyone.
Thus an important work incentive disappears at age 65. An important question, therefore, is
whether Medicare signiﬁcantly aﬀects the labor supply of the elderly, especially around age
65. This question is important because the ﬁscal cost of changing the Medicare eligibility
depends critically on the labor supply responses.
Several studies have developed structural models that can be used for such policy ex-
periments. These studies of retirement behavior, however, have arrived at very diﬀerent
conclusions about the importance of Medicare. The diﬀerent conclusions seem to result from
diﬀerences in how the studies treat market incompleteness and uncertainty, which aﬀect how
much individuals value Medicare. In this paper, we construct and estimate a structural retire-
ment model that includes not only medical expense risk and risk-reducing health insurance,
but also a savings decision that allows workers to self-insure through asset accumulation.
Including both of these features yields a more general model that can reconcile the earlier
results.
Assuming that individuals value health insurance at the cost paid by employers, both
Lumsdaine et al. (1994) and Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) ﬁnd that health insurance has
a small eﬀect on retirement behavior. One possible reason for their results is that the average
employer contribution to health insurance is relatively modest—Gustman and Steinmeier
(1994) ﬁnd that the average employer contribution to employee health insurance is about
$2,500 per year before age 65—and it declines by a relatively small amount after age 65.2 In
1Figures taken from 2006 Medicare Annual Report (The Boards of Trustees of the Hospital Insurance and
Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds, 2006).
2Data are from the 1977 NMES, adjusted to 1998 dollars with the medical component of the CPI.
2short, if health insurance is valued at the cost paid for by employers, the work disincentives
of Medicare are fairly small.
If individuals are risk-averse, however, and large out-of-pocket Medical costs are possible,
individuals could value health insurance well beyond the cost paid by employers. If individuals
are uninsured, they could face volatile medical expenses, which in turn could lead to volatile
life-cycle consumption paths. If individuals are risk-averse, they will value the consumption
smoothing that health insurance provides. Therefore, Medicare’s age-65 work disincentive
comes not only from the reduction in average medical costs paid by those without employer-
provided health insurance, but from also the reduction in the volatility of those costs.3
Addressing this point, Rust and Phelan (1997) estimate a dynamic programming model
that accounts explicitly for risk aversion and uncertainty about out-of-pocket medical ex-
penses. They ﬁnd that because of health cost uncertainty, Medicare has large eﬀects on
retirement behavior. Using newer and more inclusive data, Blau and Gilleskie (2006a, 2006b)
ﬁnd eﬀects that, although much smaller than those in Rust and Phelan, are still larger than
the eﬀects found in studies that omit medical expense risk. Rust and Phelan and Blau and
Gilleskie, however, all assume that an individual’s consumption equals his income net of out-
of-pocket medical expenses. In other words, they ignore an individual’s ability to smooth
consumption through saving. If individuals can self-insure against medical expense shocks
by saving, prohibiting saving will overstate the consumption volatility caused by medical
cost volatility. Overstating the consumption volatility caused by medical cost volatility will
in turn overstate the value of health insurance, and thus the eﬀect of health insurance on
retirement.4
Lumsdaine et al. (1994) and Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) ignore medical expense risk,
while Rust and Phelan (1997) and Blau and Gilleskie (2006a, 2006b) ignore the ability to
3While individuals can usually buy private health insurance, high administrative costs and adverse selection
problems can make it prohibitively expensive. Moreover, private coverage often does not cover pre-existing
medical conditions, whereas employer-provided coverage typically does.
4Several empirical studies suggest that self-insurance through saving is important. Smith (1999) ﬁnds
that out-of-pocket medical expenses generate large declines in wealth. Cochrane (1991) ﬁnds that short-term
illnesses generate only small declines in food consumption.
3save. A major goal of this paper is to reconcile these studies by using a more general model
of retirement behavior. In particular, we construct a life-cycle model of labor supply that not
only accounts for health cost uncertainty and health insurance, but also has a saving decision.
Moreover, we include the coverage provided by means-tested social insurance to account for
the fact that Medicaid provides a close substitute for other forms of health insurance. All of
this allows us to consider whether uncertainty and self-insurance greatly aﬀects the value of
health insurance. We also model two other important sources of retirement incentives, Social
Security and private pensions, in detail. Although Medicare, Social Security and pensions
often generate contemporaneous incentives, our approach allows us to disentangle their eﬀects.
To our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst study of its kind. While van der Klaauw and Wolpin
(2006) estimate a similar model, they focus on general retirement incentives, and thus use a
much simpler model of health costs.
Estimating the model by the Method of Simulated Moments, we ﬁnd that the model ﬁts
the data well with reasonable parameter values. The model predicts that workers whose
health insurance is tied to their job leave the labor force about 0.41 years later than workers
whose coverage extends into retirement. This result, being consistent with several reduced-
form estimates, also supports the model.
Because the Social Security beneﬁt rules vary with year of birth, the Health and Retire-
ment Survey (HRS) contains households that face diﬀerent Social Security incentives. This
allows us to perform an out-of-sample validation exercise: we estimate the model on house-
holds with earlier birth years, and then use it to predict the retirement behavior of households
with later birth years. We ﬁnd that the model does a good job of predicting the diﬀerences
between the two groups observed to date.
Next, we measure the changes in labor supply induced by raising the Medicare eligibility
age to 67 and by raising the normal Social Security retirement age to 67. We ﬁnd that shifting
the Medicare eligibility age to 67 will increase the labor force participation of workers aged
60-67 by an average of 0.9 percentage points a year. This eﬀect is similar to the eﬀect of
raising the Social Security retirement age to 67.
4We also evaluate how much individuals value health insurance. We ﬁnd that around one-
third of the value of health insurance comes from the reduction in average medical expenses,
with the remaining two thirds coming from the reduction in medical expense uncertainty. We
further ﬁnd that if individuals were unable to self-insure through savings, they would value
health insurance even more.
The rest of paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our dynamic programming model
of retirement behavior. Section 3 describes how we estimate the model using the Method of
Simulated Moments. Section 4 describes the HRS data that we use in our analysis. Section 5
presents life cycle proﬁles drawn from these data. Section 6 contains preference parameter
estimates for the structural model, and an assessment of the model’s performance, both within
and outside of the estimation sample. In Section 7, we conduct several policy experiments.
In Section 8 we consider a few important robustness checks. Section 9 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Preferences
Consider a household head seeking to maximize his expected lifetime utility at age (or
year) t, t = 1,2,...,T. Each period that he lives, the individual derives utility, Ut, from












The parameter ν, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for total utility, has two purposes.
First, as ν increases individuals become less willing to substitute consumption and leisure
across states and time. Second, ν measures the non-separability between consumption and
leisure. Under perfect foresight and interiority, ν > 1 implies that consumption and leisure
are Frisch substitutes (Low, 2005). French (2005) shows that with his estimates of γ and ν,
a life-cycle model using this utility function can replicate the consumption declines that are
observed at retirement.
5The quantity of leisure is
Lt = L − Ht − φPPt − φMMt. (2)
where L is the individual’s total annual time endowment. Participation in the labor force is
denoted by Pt, a 0-1 indicator equal to zero when hours worked, Ht, equal zero. The ﬁxed
cost of work, φP, is treated as a loss of leisure. Including ﬁxed costs helps us capture the
empirical regularity that annual hours of work are clustered around 2000 hours and 0 hours
(Cogan, 1981). We treat retirement as a form of the participation decision, and thus allow
retired workers to reenter the labor force; as stressed by Rust and Phelan (1997) and Ruhm
(1990), reverse retirement is a common phenomenon. Finally, the quantity of leisure depends
on his health status through the 0-1 indicator Mt = 1{healtht = bad}, which equals one when
his health is bad. A positive value of the parameter φM implies that people in bad health
ﬁnd it more painful to work.







Our speciﬁcation of the bequest motive follows De Nardi (2004). The parameter κ determines
the curvature of the bequest function. When κ > 0, the marginal utility of a zero-dollar
bequest is ﬁnite, and bequests are a luxury good.
An individual’s utility depends on his health status, Mt ∈ {good,bad}, which follows an
exogenous age-dependent Markov process. The individual also faces uncertain mortality. Let
st+1 = s(Mt,t + 1) denote the probability of being alive at age t + 1 conditional on being
alive at age t, which depends upon age and previous health status. Let T = 95 denote the
terminal period, so that sT+1 = 0.
62.2 Budget Constraints
The individual holds three forms of wealth: assets (including housing); pensions; and
Social Security. He receives several sources of income: asset income, rAt, where r denotes the
constant pre-tax interest rate, and At denotes ﬁnancial assets; labor income, WtHt, where
Wt denotes wages; spousal income, yst; pension beneﬁts, pbt; Social Security beneﬁts, sst;
and government transfers, trt. The asset accumulation equation is:
At+1 = At + Y (rAt + WtHt + yst + pbt,τ) + sst + trt − hct − Ct. (4)
where medical expenses are denoted hct and post-tax income, Y (rAt + WtHt + yst + pbt,τ),
is a function of taxable income and the vector τ, described in Appendix A, that captures the
tax structure.
Individuals face the borrowing constraint
At + Yt + sst + trt − Ct ≥ 0. (5)
Because it is illegal to borrow against future Social Security beneﬁts and diﬃcult to borrow
against many forms of future pension beneﬁts, individuals with low non-pension, non-Social
Security wealth may not be able to ﬁnance their retirement before their Social Security
beneﬁts become available at age 62.5
Following Hubbard et al. (1994, 1995), government transfers provide a consumption ﬂoor:
trt = max{0,Cmin − (At + Yt + sst)}, (6)
5This borrowing constraint excludes medical expenses, which we assume are realized after labor decisions
are made. We view this assumption as more reasonable than the alternative, namely that the time-t medical
expense shocks are fully known when workers decide whether to hold on to their employer-provided health
insurance. Given the borrowing constraint and timing of medical expenses, an individual with extremely high
medical expenses this year could have negative net worth next year. Given that many people in our data still
have unresolved medical expenses, medical expense debt seems reasonable. Because debt cannot legally be
bequeathed in the US, we assume that all debts are erased at time of death when calculating the value of the
bequest in equation (3).
7Equation (6) implies that government transfers bridge the gap between an individual’s “liquid
resources” (the quantity in the inner parentheses) and the consumption ﬂoor. Equation (6)
also implies that if transfers are positive, Ct = Cmin. Our treatment of government transfers
implies that individuals can always consume at least Cmin, even if their out-of-pocket medical
expenses have exceeded their ﬁnancial resources. With the government eﬀectively providing
low-asset individuals with health insurance, these people may place a low value on employer-
provided health insurance. This of course depends on the value of Cmin; if Cmin is low enough,
it will be the low-asset individuals who value health insurance most highly. Those with very
high asset levels should be able to self-insure.
2.3 Medical Expenses, Health Insurance, and Medicare
Medical expenses, hct are deﬁned as the sum of out-of-pocket costs (including those
covered by the consumption ﬂoor) and insurance premia. We assume that an individual’s
health costs depend upon: health insurance status, HIt; health status, Mt; age, t; whether
the person is working, Pt; and a person-speciﬁc eﬀect ψt:
lnhct = hc(Mt,HIt,t,Pt) + σ(Mt,HIt,t,Pt) × ψt. (7)
Note that health insurance aﬀects both the expectation of medical expenses, through hc(.)
and the variance, through σ(.).6
Following Feenberg and Skinner (1994) and French and Jones (2004a), we model the
idiosyncratic component of medical expenses, ψt, as
ψt = ζt + ξt, ξt ∼ N(0,σ2
ξ), (8)
ζt = ρhcζt−1 + ǫt, ǫt ∼ N(0,σ2
ǫ), (9)
6We follow the existing literature and impose the simplifying assumption that medical expenditures are
exogenous. (To our knowledge, Blau and Gilleskie (2006b) is the only structural retirement study to have
endogenous medical expenditures.) To the extent medical expenses are endogenous, our results will overstate
the eﬀects of health insurance.
8where ξt and ǫt are serially and mutually independent. ξt is the transitory component of
health cost uncertainty, while ζt is the persistent component, with autocorrelation ρhc.
Diﬀerences in labor supply behavior across health insurance categories, HIt, are an im-
portant part of identifying our model. We assume that there are four mutually exclusive
categories of health insurance coverage. The ﬁrst is retiree coverage, where workers keep
their health insurance even after leaving their jobs.7 The second category is tied health in-
surance, where workers receive employer-provided coverage as long as they continue to work.
If a worker with tied health insurance leaves his job, however, he enters the third category and
receives “COBRA” coverage, COBRA, which allows him to purchase insurance at his em-
ployer’s group rate. After one year of COBRA coverage, the worker’s insurance ceases.8 The
fourth category consists of individuals whose potential employers provide no health insurance
at all, or none.9 Workers move between these insurance categories according to
HIt =

        
        
retiree if HIt−1 = retiree
tied if HIt−1 = tied and Ht > 0
COBRA if HIt−1 = tied and Ht = 0
none if HIt−1 = none or HIt−1 = COBRA
. (10)
In imposing this transition rule, we are assuming that people out of the work force are never
oﬀered jobs with insurance coverage, and that workers with tied coverage never upgrade to
retiree coverage. Restricting access to insurance in this way most likely leads us to overstate
the value of employer-provided health insurance.
An individual’s medical expenses depend not only on his private insurance coverage,
HIt, but also on his access to Medicare. Almost all individuals that are 65 or older are
7If they leave their job, however, their medical expenses may rise, as those with retiree coverage often pay
for their insurance, albeit at lower group rates, after they retire.
8Although there is some variability across states as to how long individuals are eligible for employer-provided
health insurance coverage, by Federal law most individuals are covered for 18 months (Gruber and Madrian,
1995). Given a model period of one year, we approximate the 18-month period as one year.
9Workers in the none category buy insurance on their own, receive some sort of government coverage,
or simply go uncovered. For simplicity, we assume that the three groups share a common medical expense
distribution.
9eligible for Medicare, in addition to the insurance coverage described in equation (10).10
Thus individuals without employer-provided insurance can receive Medicare coverage once
they turn 65, reducing both the mean and the variance of their medical expenses.
2.4 Wages and Spousal Income
We assume that the logarithm of wages at time t, lnWt, is a function of health status
(Mt), age (t), hours worked (Ht) and an autoregressive component, ωt:
lnWt = W(Mt,t) + αlnHt + ωt, (11)
The inclusion of hours, Ht, in the wage determination equation captures the empirical regu-
larity that, all else equal, part-time workers earn relatively lower wages than full time work-
ers. The autoregressive component ωt has the correlation coeﬃcient ρW and the normally-
distributed innovation ηt:
ωt = ρWωt−1 + ηt, ηt ∼ N(0,σ2
η). (12)
Because spousal income can serve as insurance against medical shocks, we include it in
the model. In the interest of computational simplicity, we assume that spousal income is a
deterministic function of an individual’s age and the exogenous component of his wages:
yst = ys(W(Mt,t) + ωt,t). (13)
These features allow us to capture assortive mating and the age-earnings proﬁle.
10Individuals who have paid into the Medicare system for at least 10 years become eligible at age 65. A
more detailed description of the Medicare eligibility rules is available at http://www.medicare.gov/.
102.5 Social Security and Pensions
Because pensions and Social Security both generate potentially important retirement
incentives, we model the two programs in detail.
Individuals receive no Social Security beneﬁts until they apply, i.e., sst = 0 until the
beneﬁt indicator Bt equals 1. Individuals can ﬁrst apply for beneﬁts at age 62. Upon applying
the individual receives beneﬁts until death. The individual’s Social Security beneﬁts depend
on his Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), which is roughly his average income
during his 35 highest earnings years in the labor market.
The Social Security System provides three major retirement incentives.11 First, while
income earned by workers with less than 35 years of earnings automatically increases their
AIME, income earned by workers with more than 35 years of earnings increases their AIME
only if it exceeds earnings in some previous year of work. Because Social Security beneﬁts
increase in AIME, this causes work incentives to drop after 35 years in the labor market.
We describe the computation of AIME in more detail in Appendix C.
Second, the age at which the individual applies for Social Security aﬀects the level of
beneﬁts. For every year before age 65 the individual applies for beneﬁts, beneﬁts are reduced
by 6.67% of the age-65 level. This is roughly actuarially fair. But for every year after age 65
that beneﬁt application is delayed, beneﬁts rise by 5.5% up until age 70. This is less than
actuarially fair, and encourages people to apply for beneﬁts by age 65.
Third, the Social Security Earnings Test taxes labor income of beneﬁciaries at a high rate.
For individuals aged 62-64, each dollar of labor income above the “test” threshold of $9,120
leads to a 1/2 dollar decrease in Social Security beneﬁts, until all beneﬁts have been taxed
away. For individuals aged 65-69 before 2000, each dollar of labor income above a threshold of
$14,500 leads to a 1/3 dollar decrease in Social Security beneﬁts, until all beneﬁts have been
taxed away. Although beneﬁts taxed away by the earnings test are credited to future beneﬁts,
11A description of the Social Security rules can be found in recent editions of the Green Book (Committee
on Ways and Means). Some of the rules, such as the beneﬁt adjustment formula, depends on an individual’s
year of birth. Because we ﬁt our model to a group of individuals that on average were born in 1933, we use
the beneﬁt formula for that birth year.
11after age 64 the crediting rate is less than actuarially fair, so that the Social Security Earnings
Test eﬀectively taxes the labor income of beneﬁciaries aged 65-69.12 When combined with
the aforementioned incentives to draw Social Security beneﬁts by age 65, the Earnings Test
discourages work after age 65. In 2000, the Social Security Earnings Test was abolished for
those 65 and older. Because those born in 1933 (the average birth year in our sample) turned
67 in 2000, we assume that the earnings test was repealed at age 67. These incentives are
incorporated in the calculation of sst, which is deﬁned to be net of the earnings test.
Pension beneﬁts, pbt, are a function of the worker’s age and pension wealth. Pension
wealth (the present value of pension beneﬁts) in turn depends on pension accruals. We
assume that pension accruals are a function of a worker’s age, labor income, and health
insurance type, using a formula estimated from conﬁdential HRS pension data. The data
show that pension accrual rates diﬀer greatly across health insurance categories; accounting
for these diﬀerences is essential in isolating the eﬀects of employer-provided health insurance.
When ﬁnding an individual’s decision rules, we assume further that the individual’s existing
pension wealth is a function of his Social Security wealth, age, and health insurance type.
Details of our pension model are described in Section 4.3 and Appendix B.
2.6 Recursive Formulation









t (L − Ht − φPPt − φREREt − φMMt)1−γ
 1−ν






where the parameter β is the time discount factor, subject to equations (5) and (6). The
vector Xt = (At,Bt−1,Mt,AIMEt,HIt−1,ωt,ζt−1) contains the individual’s state variables,
while the function F( | ) gives the conditional distribution of these state variables, using
12The credit rates are based on the beneﬁt adjustment formula. If a year’s worth of beneﬁts are taxed away
between ages 62 and 64, beneﬁts in the future are increased by 6.67%. If a year’s worth of beneﬁts are taxed
away between ages 65 and 66, beneﬁts in the future are increased by 5.5%.
12equations (4) and (7) - (13).13
An individual’s decisions thus depend on his state variables, Xt, his preferences, θ, and
















It follows that the solution to the individual’s problem consists of the consumption rules
Ct(Xt,θ,χ), the work rules Ht(Xt;θ,χ), and the beneﬁt application rules Bt(Xt;θ,χ) that
solve equation (14). Given that the model lacks a closed form solution, these decision rules
are found numerically using value function iteration. To reduce the computational burden,
we assume that all workers apply for Social Security beneﬁts by age 70, and retire by age 72:
for t ≥ 70, Bt = 1; and for t ≥ 72, Ht = 0. Appendix D describes our numerical methodology.
3 Estimation
Our goal is to estimate preferences, θ, and beliefs, χ. Computational concerns lead us to
use a two-step strategy, similar to the ones used by Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and French
(2005). In the ﬁrst step we estimate some belief parameters and calibrate others. In doing
this we assume that individuals have rational expectations, so that the belief parameters
can be found by estimating the data generating process for the exogenous state variables.
We describe the belief parameters in Section 4. In the second step we estimate preference
parameters using the method of simulated moments (MSM). In the next three subsections,
we describe our MSM methodology in more detail.
13Spousal income and pension beneﬁts (see Appendix B) depend only on the other state variables and are
thus not state variables themselves.
133.1 Moment Conditions
Because some of the state variables Xt are almost surely mismeasured, traditional esti-
mators, such as maximum likelihood or non-linear least squares, are unlikely to be consistent.
For example, wages are notoriously mismeasured in virtually all datasets.14 Although mea-
surement error can be incorporated into the standard maximum likelihood framework, doing
so tends to be computationally expensive. We instead estimate the model by the MSM, an
approach that places fewer demands on the data.15
The objective of MSM estimation is to ﬁnd the preference vector ˆ θ that yields simulated
life-cycle decision proﬁles that “best match” (as measured by a GMM criterion function) the
proﬁles from the data. The moment conditions that comprise our estimator are:
1. Because an individual’s ability to self-insure against medical expense shocks depends
critically upon his asset level, we match 1/3rd and 2/3rd asset quantiles by age.16 We
match these quantiles in each of T periods (ages), for a total of 2T moment conditions.
2. We match exit rates by age for each health insurance category. With three health
insurance categories (none, retiree and tied17), this generates 3T moment conditions.
3. Because the value a worker places on employer-provided health insurance may depend
on his wealth, we match labor force participation conditional on the combination of
asset grouping and health insurance status. With 2 quantiles (generating 3 quantile-
conditional means) and 3 health insurance types, this generates 9T moment conditions.
14Because we use earnings divided by hours as the wage measure, measurement error in hours aﬀects both
measured wages and measured hours, creating the well-known “division bias” problem.
15Gourinchas and Parker (2002) develop this point in more detail in the context of a model of life-cycle
consumption. A related approach that explicitly incorporates measurement error is to use simulated age-
conditional likelihood functions, as in Keane and Wolpin (2001). By working with unconditional (or age-
conditional) distributions, rather than the conditional (on Xt) distribution used in traditional likelihood
estimation, Keane and Wolpin’s approach avoids problems caused by measurement error in Xt, in much the
same way as does the MSM.
16Our approach to constructing quantile-related moment conditions follows Manski (1988), Powell (1994),
or Buchinsky (1998). Chernozhukov and Hansen (2002) provide additional, earlier, references. Related ap-
proaches appear in Epple and Seig (1999) and Cagetti (2003).
17Because we are interested in participation given one’s opportunity set, we combine individuals who work
and receive tied insurance with those who do not work and receive COBRA coverage, as those two groups
had the same insurance opportunities.
144. The HRS asks workers about their willingness to work and/or their expectations about
working in the future. We combine the answers to these questions into a time-invariant
index, pref ∈ {high,low,out}. Because labor force participation diﬀers signiﬁcantly
across values of pref, and because pref signiﬁcantly improves reduced-form predictions
of employment, we interpret this index as a measure of otherwise unobserved preferences
toward work. Matching participation conditional on each value of this index generates
another 3T moment conditions.
5. Finally, we match hours of work and participation conditional on our binary health
indicator. This generates 4T moment conditions.
Combined, the ﬁve preceding items result in 21T moment conditions. Appendix E de-
scribes the moment conditions in more detail.
3.2 Initial Conditions and Preference Heterogeneity
It is almost surely the case that individuals with diﬀerent types of health insurance diﬀer
systematically along several other dimensions. For example, individuals with retiree coverage
tend to have higher wages and more generous pensions. We control for this “initial conditions”
problem in three ways. First, as described immediately below, initial distribution of simulated
individuals is drawn directly from the data. Because wealthy households are more likely to
have retiree coverage in the data, wealthy households are more likely to have retiree coverage
in our initial distribution. Second, we model carefully the way in which pension and Social
Security accrual varies across individuals and groups.
Finally, we control for unobservable diﬀerences across health insurance groups by in-
troducing permanent preference heterogeneity, using the approach developed by Heckman
and Singer (1984) and adapted by (among others) Keane and Wolpin (1997) and van der
Klaauw and Wolpin (2006). Each individual is assumed to belong to one of a ﬁnite number
of preference “types”, with the probability of belonging to a particular type a function of the
individual’s preference index, initial wealth, wages and health insurance type. This approach
15allows for the possibility that people with diﬀerent preferences systematically self-select into
diﬀerent types of health insurance coverage. In practice, we assume that the type probabili-
ties are a logistic function of the observable initial conditions, and expand the deﬁnition of θ
to include type-speciﬁc parameters and the coeﬃcients of the type probability equations.
3.3 Estimation Mechanics
The mechanics of our MSM procedure are as follows:
1. We aggregate the sample data into life cycle proﬁles for hours, participation, exit rates
and assets.
2. Using the same data used to estimate the proﬁles, we generate an initial distribution
for health, health insurance status, wages, medical expenses, AIME, and assets. See
Appendix F for details. We also use these data to estimate many of the parameters
contained in the belief vector χ, although we calibrate other parameters. The initial
distribution also includes preference type, assigned using our type prediction equation.
3. Using χ, we generate matrices of random health, wage, mortality and medical expense
shocks. The matrices hold shocks for 40,000 simulated individuals.
4. We compute the decision rules for an initial guess of the parameter vector θ, using χ
and the numerical methods described in Appendix D.
5. We simulate proﬁles for the decision variables. Each simulated individual receives a
draw of preference type, assets, health, wages and medical expenses from the initial
distribution, and is assigned one of the simulated sequences of health, wage and health
cost shocks. With the initial distributions and the sequence of shocks, we then use
the decision rules to generate that person’s decisions over the life cycle. Each period’s
decisions determine the conditional distribution of the next period’s states, and the
simulated shocks pin the states down exactly.
166. We aggregate the simulated data into life cycle proﬁles.18
7. We compute moment conditions, i.e., we ﬁnd the distance between the simulated and
true proﬁles, as described in Appendix E.
8. We pick a new value of θ, update the simulated distribution of preference types, and
repeat steps 4-7.
The value of θ that minimizes the distance between the true data and the simulated data,
ˆ θ, is the estimated value of θ0.19 We discuss the asymptotic distribution of the parameter
estimates, the weighting matrix and the overidentiﬁcation tests in Appendix E.
4 Data and Calibrations
4.1 HRS Data
We estimate the model using data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). The
HRS is a sample of non-institutionalized individuals, aged 51-61 in 1992, and their spouses.
With the exception of assets and health costs, which are measured at the household level,
our data are for male household heads. The HRS surveys individuals every two years, so
that we have 7 waves of data covering the period 1992-2004. The HRS also asks respondents
retrospective questions about their work history that allow us to infer whether the individual
worked in non-survey years. Details of this, as well as variable deﬁnitions, selection criteria,
and a description of the initial joint distribution, are in Appendix F.
As noted above, the Social Security beneﬁt adjustment formula depends on an individual’s
year of birth. To ensure that workers in our sample face a similar set of Social Security
retirement incentives, we ﬁt our model to the decision proﬁles of the cohort of individuals aged
18Because the moments we match include asset quantiles and asset-quantile-conditional participation rates,
measurement error could aﬀect our results. In earlier drafts of this paper (French and Jones, 2004b) we added
measurement error to the simulated asset histories. Adding measurement error, however, had little eﬀect on
either the preference parameter estimates or policy experiments. For the moments we ﬁt, the measurement
error is largely averaged out.
19Because the GMM criterion function is discontinuous, we search over the parameter space using a Simplex
algorithm written by Honore and Kyriazidou. It usually takes around 2 weeks to estimate the model on a
20-node cluster, with each iteration (of steps 4-7) taking around 30 minutes.
1757-61 in 1992. On the other hand, when estimating the stochastic processes that individuals
face, we often use the full sample in order to increase sample size.
With the exception of wages, we do not adjust the data for cohort eﬀects. Because our
subsample of the HRS covers a fairly narrow age range, this omission should not generate
much bias.
4.2 Health Insurance and Health Costs
We assign individuals to one of four mutually exclusive health insurance groups: retiree,
tied, COBRA, and none, as described in section 2. Because of small sample problems, the
none group includes those with no insurance as well as those with private insurance. Both
face high medical expenses because they lack employer-provided coverage. Because the model
includes a consumption ﬂoor to capture the insurance provided by Medicaid, the none group
also includes those whose only form of health insurance is Medicaid. We assign those who
have health insurance provided by their spouse to the retiree group, along with those who
report that they could keep their health insurance if they left their jobs. Neither of these
types has their health insurance tied to their job. We assign individuals who would lose their
employer-provided health insurance after leaving their job to the tied group.
Although the HRS’s insurance-related data are detailed, they are never completely con-
sistent with our deﬁnitions of tied or retiree coverage. Appendix G shows, however, that the
health-insurance-speciﬁc job exit rates are not very sensitive to the assumptions we imposed
in interpreting the data.
The HRS has data on self-reported medical expenses. Medical expenses are the sum of
insurance premia paid by the household, drug costs, and out of pocket costs for hospital,
nursing home care, doctor visits, dental visits, and outpatient care. We are interested in the
medical expenses that households face. Unfortunately, we observe only the medical expenses
that these households actually pay for. This means that the observed medical expense distri-
bution for low-wealth households is censored, because programs such as Medicaid pay much of
their medical expenses. Because our model explicitly accounts for government transfers, the
18appropriate measure of medical expenses includes medical expenses paid by the government.
Therefore, we assign Medicaid payments to households that received Medicaid beneﬁts. The
2000 Green Book (Committee on Ways and Means, 2000, p. 923) reports that in 1998 the
average Medicaid payment was $10,242 per beneﬁciary aged 65 and older, and $9,097 per
blind or disabled beneﬁciary. Starting with this average, we then assume that Medicaid pay-
ments have the same volatility as the medical care payments made by uninsured households.
This allows us to generate a distribution of Medicaid payments.
We ﬁt these data to the health cost model described in Section 2. Because of small
sample problems, we allow the mean, hc(.), and standard deviation, σ(.), to depend only
on the individual’s Medicare eligibility, health insurance type, health status, labor force
participation and age. Following the procedure described in French and Jones (2004a), hc(.)
and σ(.) are set so that the model replicates the mean and 95th percentile of the cross-
sectional distribution of medical expenses (in levels, not logs) in each of these categories. We
found that this procedure did an extremely good job of matching the top 20% of the medical
expense distribution. Details are in Appendix H.
Table 1 presents some summary statistics, conditional on health status. Table 1 shows
that for healthy individuals who are 64 years old, and thus not receiving Medicare, average
annual medical costs are $2,950 for those with tied coverage and $5,140 for those with no
employer-provided coverage, a diﬀerence of $2,190. With the onset of Medicare at age 65, the
diﬀerence shrinks to $410. For individuals in bad health, the diﬀerence shrinks from $2,810
at age 64 to $530 at age 65.20
As Rust and Phelan (1997) emphasize, it is not just diﬀerences in mean medical expenses
that determine the value of health insurance, but also diﬀerences in variance and skewness.
If health insurance reduces health cost volatility, risk-averse individuals may value health
insurance at well beyond the cost paid by employers. To give a sense of the volatility, Table 1
also presents the standard deviation and 99.5th percentile of the health cost distributions.
20The pre-Medicare cost diﬀerences are roughly comparable to EBRI’s (1999) estimate that employers on
average contribute $3,288 to their employees’ health insurance.
19Retiree - Retiree -
Working Not Working Tied COBRA None
Age = 64, without Medicare, Good Health
Mean $2,930 $3,360 $2,950 $3,670 $5,140
Standard Deviation $6,100 $7,050 $7,150 $8,390 $19,060
99.5th Percentile $35,530 $41,020 $40,210 $47,890 $91,560
Age = 65, with Medicare, Good Health
Mean $2,590 $2,800 $3,420 $2,750 $3,830
Standard Deviation $4,700 $4,700 $5,370 $5,420 $8,090
99.5th Percentile $28,000 $28,240 $32,460 $31,880 $47,010
Age = 64, without Medicare, Bad Health
Mean $3,750 $4,300 $3,770 $4,690 $6,580
Standard Deviation $7,970 $9,220 $9,330 $10,960 $24,840
99.5th Percentile $46,240 $53,380 $52,210 $62,240 $118,400
Age = 65, with Medicare, Bad Health
Mean $3,310 $3,580 $4,380 $3,520 $4,910
Standard Deviation $6,150 $6,150 $7,040 $7,080 $10,570
99.5th Percentile $36,530 $36,890 $42,460 $41,520 $61,180
Table 1: Medical Expenses, by Medicare and Health Insurance Status
Table 1 shows that for healthy individuals who are 64 years old, average annual medical costs
have a standard deviation of $7,150 for those with tied coverage and $19,060 for those with no
employer-provided coverage. With the onset of Medicare at age 65, average annual medical
costs have a standard deviation of $5,370 for those with tied coverage and $8,090 for those
with no employer-provided coverage. Therefore, Medicare not only reduces average health
costs for those without employer-provided health insurance. It also reduces the volatility of
health costs.
Relative to other research on the cross sectional distribution of medical expenses, we ﬁnd
higher medical expenses at the far right tail of the distribution. For example, Blau and
Gilleskie (2006a) use diﬀerent data and methods to ﬁnd average medical expenses that are
comparable to our estimates. However, they ﬁnd that medical expenses are much less volatile
than our estimates suggest. For example, they ﬁnd that for households in good health and
younger than 65, the maximum expense levels (which seem to be slightly less likely than
0.5% probability events) were $69,260 for those without coverage, $6,400 for those with
retiree coverage, and $6,400 for those with tied coverage. Table 1 shows that our estimates
20of the 99.5th percentile (i.e., the top 0.5 percentile of the distribution) of the distributions
for healthy individuals are $91,560 for those with no coverage, $41,020 for those with retiree
coverage, and $40,210 for those with tied coverage.
Berk and Monheit (2001) use data from the MEPS, which arguably has the highest
quality medical expense data of all the surveys. Using a measure of medical expenses that
should be comparable to our estimates for the uninsured,21 Berk and Monheit ﬁnd that
those in the top 1% of the medical expense distribution have average medical expenses of
$57,900 (in 1998 dollars). Again, this is below our estimate of $91,560 for the uninsured. This
discrepancy is not completely surprising. Berk and Monheit’s estimates are for all individuals
in the population, whereas our estimates are for older households (many of which include two
individuals). Furthermore, Berk and Monheit’s estimates exclude all nursing home expenses,
while the HRS, although initially consisting only of non-institutionalized households, captures
the nursing home expenses these households incur in later waves.
The parameters for the idiosyncratic process ψt, (σ2
ξ,σ2
ǫ,ρhc), are taken from French and
Jones (2004a). Table 2 presents the parameters, which have been normalized so that the
overall variance, σ2
ψ, is one. Table 2 reveals that at any point in time, the transitory compo-
nent generates almost 67% of the cross-sectional variance in medical expenses. The results in
French and Jones reveal, however, that most of the variance in cumulative lifetime medical
expenses is generated by innovations to the persistent component. Given the autocorrelation
coeﬃcient ρhc of 0.925, this is not surprising.
Parameter Variable Estimate
σ2
ǫ innovation variance of persistent component 0.04811
ρhc autocorrelation of persistent component 0.925
σ2
ξ innovation variance of transitory component 0.6668
Table 2: Variance and Persistence of Innovations to Medical Expenses
21Berk and Monheit use data on total billable expenses. The uninsured should pay all billable expenses, so
Berk and Monheit’s estimated distribution should be comparable to our distribution for the uninsured.
214.3 Pension Accrual
Appendix B gives details on how we use the conﬁdential HRS pension data to construct
an accrual rate formula. Figure 1 shows the average pension accrual rates generated by this
formula, conditional on having average income.
Figure 1: Average Pension Accrual Rates, by Age and Health Insurance Coverage
Workers with retiree coverage are the most likely to have deﬁned beneﬁt plans (which
often have sharp drops in pension accrual after age 60), workers with tied coverage are the
most likely to have a deﬁned contribution plan, and workers with no coverage are the most
likely no have no pension plan. As a result, those with retiree coverage face the sharpest
drops in pension accrual after age 60.22 Furthermore, the conﬁdential pension data show
that, conditional on having a deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan, those with retiree coverage face
the sharpest drops in pension accrual after age 60. In short, not only does retiree coverage
in and of itself provide an incentive for early retirement, but the pension plans associated
with retiree coverage provide the strongest incentives for early retirement. Modeling the
association between pension accrual and health insurance coverage is thus critical; failing to
22Because Figure 1 is based on our estimation sample, it does not show accrual rates for earlier ages.
Background results show, however, that those with retiree coverage have the highest pension accrual rates in
their early and middle 50s.
22capture this link will lead the econometrician to overstate the importance of retiree coverage
on retirement.
4.4 Preference Index
In order to better measure preference heterogeneity in the population (and how it is
correlated with health insurance), we generate a person’s “willingness” to work using three
questions from the ﬁrst wave (1992) of the HRS. The ﬁrst question asks the respondent the
extent to which he agrees with the statement, “Even if I didn’t need the money, I would
probably keep on working.” The second question asks the respondent, “When you think
about the time when you will retire, are you looking forward to it, are you uneasy about it,
or what?” The third question asks, “How much do you enjoy your job?”
To combine these three questions into a single index, we include the questions (along with
missing value indicators) in a reduced-form regression of employment (in waves 5-7). Other
variables in the regression include polynomials and interactions of all the state variables in the
model: age, health status, wages, wealth, and AIME, medical expenses, and health insurance
type. Responses to these questions have a great deal of predictive power for retirement,
even after controlling for the other state variables. Multiplying the numerical responses to
the three questions by their respective coeﬃcients and summing yields an index. We then
discretize the index into three values: high, for the top 50% of the index for those working
in wave 1; low, for the bottom 50% of the index for those working in wave 1; and out for
those not working in wave 1. Appendix I provides additional details on the construction of
the index and Figure 7 for evidence on the predictive power of the index.
4.5 Wages
Recall from equation (11) that lnWt = αln(Ht)+W(Mt,t)+ωt. Following Aaronson and
French (2004), we set α = 0.415, which implies that a 50% drop in work hours leads to a 25%
drop in the oﬀered hourly wage. This is in the middle of the range of estimates of the eﬀect
of hours worked on the oﬀered hourly wage. Because the wage information in the HRS varies
23from wave to wave, we take the second term, W(Mt,t), from French (2005), who estimates a
ﬁxed eﬀects wage proﬁle using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We rescale
the level of wages to match the average wages observed in the HRS at age 59.
Because ﬁxed-eﬀects estimators estimate the growth rates of wages of the same individuals,
the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator accounts for cohort eﬀects—the cohort eﬀect is the average ﬁxed
eﬀect for all members of that cohort. However, if individuals leave the market because of a
sudden wage drop, such as from job loss, wage growth rates for workers will be greater than
wage growth rates for non-workers. This will bias estimated wage growth upward. To correct
for this problem, our baseline analysis uses the selection-adjusted wage proﬁles estimated by
French (2005).
The parameters for the idiosyncratic process ωt, (σ2
η,ρW) are also estimated by French
(2005). The results indicate that the autocorrelation coeﬃcient ρW is 0.977; wages are almost
a random walk. The estimate of the innovation variance σ2
η is 0.0141; one standard deviation
of an innovation in the wage is 12% of wages. These estimates imply a high degree of long-run
wage uncertainty.
4.6 Remaining Calibrations
We set the interest rate r equal to 0.03. Spousal income depends upon an age polynomial
and the wage. Health status and mortality both depend on previous health status interacted
with an age polynomial. We estimate the Markov transition matrices using data from the
HRS and Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old.
5 Data Proﬁles and Initial Conditions
5.1 Data Proﬁles
Figure 2 shows the 1/3rd and 2/3rd asset quantiles at each age for the HRS sample. About
one third of the men sampled live in households with less than $80,000 in assets, and about
one third live in households with over $270,000 of assets. The asset proﬁles also show that
24assets grow with age. This growth is higher than that reported in other studies (for example,
Cagetti, 2003, and French, 2005). Earlier drafts of this paper showed that the run-up in asset
prices during the sample period can explain some, although not all, of this run-up.
Figure 2: Asset Quantiles, Data
The ﬁrst panel of Figure 3 shows empirical job exit rates by health insurance type. Recall
that Medicare should provide the largest labor market incentives for workers that have tied
health insurance. If these people place a high value on employer-provided health insurance,
they should either work until age 65, when they are eligible for Medicare, or they should
work until age 63.5 and use COBRA coverage as a bridge to Medicare. The job exit proﬁles
provide some evidence that those with tied coverage do tend to work until age 65. While the
age-65 job exit rate is similar for those whose health insurance type is tied (20.5%), retiree
(21.2%), or none (21.2%), those with retiree coverage have signiﬁcantly higher exit rates at
62 (22.9%) than those with tied (16.9%) or none (14.0%). At almost every age other than
65, those with retiree coverage have higher job exit rates than those with tied or no coverage.
These diﬀerences across health insurance groups, while large, are smaller than the diﬀerences
in the empirical exit proﬁles reported in Rust and Phelan (1997).23
23The diﬀerences across groups are not statistically diﬀerent at the 5% level. However, when we include our
validation sample of younger individuals, the exit rates look similar, and are statistically diﬀerent at age 62.
25If individuals with tied coverage use COBRA coverage as a bridge to Medicare, we would
expect that those with tied coverage would be more likely to exit the labor market at age 63.5.
Those with tied coverage, however, have lower job exit rates at ages 63 and 64 than those
with retiree coverage. Because COBRA coverage is costly, this is not evidence that people
do not value retiree health insurance. It is evidence, however, that people place relatively
little value on the insurance aspect of health insurance, as the option to buy actuarially fair
insurance when not working appears to have a small eﬀect on job exit rates.
The health insurance classiﬁcations generated by the HRS data probably contain measure-
ment error. Appendix G shows job exit rates generated under several alternative measures
of health insurance type. All of the measures generate similar sets of proﬁles.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 presents observed labor force participation rates. In com-
paring participation rates across health insurance categories, it is useful to keep in mind the
transitions implied by equation (10): retiring workers in the tied insurance category transi-
tion into the none category. Because of this, the labor force participation rates for those with
tied insurance are calculated over a group of individuals that were all working in the previous
period. It is therefore unsurprising that the tied category has the highest participation rates.
Conversely, it is not surprising that the none category has the lowest participation rates,
given that category includes tied workers who retire.
Furthermore, F-tests reject the hypothesis that the three groups have identical exit rates at all ages at the
5% level.
26Figure 3: Job Exit and Participation Rates, Data
275.2 Initial Conditions
Each artiﬁcial individual in our model begins its simulated life with the year-1992 state
vector of an individual, aged 57-61 in 1992, observed in the data. Table 3 summarizes this
initial distribution, the construction of which is described in Appendix F. Table 3 shows
that individuals with retiree coverage tend to have the most asset and pension wealth, while
individuals in the none category have the least—the median individual in the none category
has no pension wealth at all. Individuals in the none category are also more likely to be in
bad health, and not surprisingly, less likely to be working. In contrast, individuals with tied
coverage have high values of the preference index, suggesting that their delayed retirement
might reﬂect diﬀerences in preferences as well as in incentives.
Retiree Tied None
Age
Mean 58.7 58.6 58.7
Standard deviation 1.5 1.5 1.5
AIME (in thousands of 1998 dollars)
Mean 25.1 25.3 16.5
Median 27.2 26.9 16.4
Standard deviation 9.1 8.6 9.2
Assets (in thousands of 1998 dollars)
Mean 229.7 203.5 201.6
Median 146.0 112.3 55.6
Standard deviation 246.1 254.3 306.7
Pension Wealth (in thousands of 1998 dollars)
Mean 129.2 80.0 18.7
Median 65.1 14.5 0.0
Standard deviation 181.2 213.4 100.8
Wage (in 1998 dollars)
Mean 17.2 17.7 12.6
Median 14.7 14.6 8.5
Standard deviation 12.2 12.3 14.4
Preference index
Fraction out 0.27 0.04 0.48
Fraction low 0.42 0.44 0.18
Fraction high 0.32 0.52 0.33
Fraction in bad health 0.20 0.13 0.41
Fraction working 0.73 0.96 0.52
Number of observations 1,022 225 454
Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Initial Distribution
286 Baseline Results
6.1 Preference Parameter Estimates
The goal of our MSM estimation procedure is to match the life cycle proﬁles for assets,
hours and participation found in the HRS data. In order to use these proﬁles to identify pref-
erences, we make several identifying assumptions, the most important being that preferences
vary with age only as a result of changes in health status. Therefore, age can be thought of
as an “exclusion restriction”, which changes the incentives for work and savings but does not
change preferences.
Table 4 presents preference parameter estimates under several diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In
this section, we discuss the baseline speciﬁcation. We discuss the other speciﬁcations for
Sections 8.1 and 8 below. The ﬁrst 6 rows of Table 4 show the parameters that vary across
the preference types. We assume that there are three types of individuals, and that the types
diﬀer in the utility weight on consumption, γ, and their time discount factor, β. Individuals
with high values of γ are more willing to work. Individuals with high values of β are more
willing to defer leisure, working many hours when young and few hours when old.
Table 4 reveals signiﬁcant diﬀerences in γ and β across the preference types. To un-
derstand these diﬀerences, it is useful to consider Table 5, which shows simulated summary
statistics for each of the preference types.24 Table 5 reveals that Type-0 workers, many of
whom were not working when the sample began, place a high value on leisure. Type-1 agents
are most likely to have a preference index value of low. The data show that low-index-type
agents initially work large numbers of hours, but then rapidly reduce their labor supply.
Type-2 agents, in contrast, tend to supply relatively large amounts of labor throughout the
sample period. Finally, Type-2 agents also include wealthy individuals who have no health in-
surance coverage. Given that many of these individuals are entrepreneurs, it is not surprising
that they are often placed in the “motivated” group.
24We assume that the probability of belonging to a particular type follows a multinomial logit function. The
estimated coeﬃcients for this type prediction equation are shown in Appendix J.
29No Homogeneous Illiquid
Baseline Saving Preferences Housing
Parameter and Deﬁnition (1) (2) (3) (4)
γ: consumption weight
Type 0 0.438 0.239 NA 0.403
(0.080) (9.760) (0.113)
Type 1 0.620 0.548 0.700 0.695
(0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Type 2 0.907 0.928 NA 0.911
(0.028) (0.031) (0.026)
β: time discount factor
Type 0 0.828 0.828 NA 0.821
(0.072) (NA) (0.074)
Type 1 1.115 1.115 0.971 0.858
(0.016) (NA) (0.010) (0.012)
Type 2 0.971 0.971 NA 0.957
(0.077) (NA) (0.067)
ν: coeﬃcient of relative 7.49 6.61 3.93 6.46
risk aversion, utility (0.421) (0.166) (0.202) (0.196)
L: leisure endowment, 3,863 4,052 4,101 3,960
in hours (51.9) (26.2) (34.3) (47.6)
φP: ﬁxed cost of work, 835 1,146 1,196 904
in hours (27.4) (30.5) (16.3) (20.4)
φM: hours of leisure lost, 445 432 432 412
bad health (38.8) (29.6) (28.1) (12.9)
θB: bequest weight† 0.0320 0.00 0.0241 0.0338
(0.0009) (NA) (0.0005) (0.0022)
κ: bequest shifter, 449 0.00 509 460
in thousands (31.7) (NA) (12.6) (32.3)
cmin: consumption ﬂoor 4,118 3,517 5,386 6,275
(159.5) (159.1) (141.1) (215.7)
GMM Criterion 1,137 792 1,887 1,107
χ2 statistic 1,677 1,211 1,009 3,081
Degrees of freedom 181 96 171 181
Diagonal weighting matrix used in calculations. See Appendix E for details.
Standard errors in parentheses.
†Parameter expressed as marginal propensity to consume out of
ﬁnal-period wealth.
Table 4: Estimated Structural Parameters
30Type 0 Type 1 Type 2
Key preference parameters
γ∗ 0.438 0.620 0.907
β∗ 0.828 1.115 0.971
Assets ($000s) 164 236 239
Pension Wealth ($000s) 92 103 56
Wages ($/hour) 10.5 19.4 11.7
Health insurance = none 0.405 0.232 0.184
Health insurance = retiree 0.578 0.642 0.461
Health insurance = tied 0.018 0.126 0.355
Preference Index = out 0.930 0.098 0.0002
Preference Index = low 0.004 0.591 0.0018
Preference Index = high 0.066 0.311 0.998
Fraction 0.250 0.600 0.150
∗Values of β and γ are from Table 4.
Table 5: Mean Values by Preference Type, Simulations
Including preference heterogeneity allows us to control for the possibility that workers with
diﬀerent preferences select jobs with diﬀerent health insurance packages. Table 5 suggests
that some self-selection is occurring, as it reveals that workers with tied coverage are more
likely to be Type-2 agents, who have the strongest preference for work. This suggests that
workers with tied coverage might be more willing to retire at later dates simply because they
have a lower disutility of work.
The bottom line of Table 5 shows the fraction of each preference type. Averaging over the
three preference types reveals that the average value of β implied by our model is 1.02, which
is slightly higher than most estimates. There are two reasons for this. The ﬁrst reason is clear
upon inspection of the Euler Equation: ∂Ut
∂Ct ≥ βst+1(1 + r(1 − τt))Et
∂Ut+1
∂Ct+1, where τt is the
marginal tax rate.25 Note that this equation identiﬁes the product βst+1(1 + r(1 − τt)), but
not its individual elements. Therefore, a lower value of st+1 or (1+r(1−τt)) results in a higher
estimate of β. Given that many studies omit mortality risk and taxes—implicitly setting st+1
and 1 − τt to one—it is not surprising that they ﬁnd lower values of β. The second reason is
that β is identiﬁed not only by the intertemporal substitution of consumption, as embodied
in the asset proﬁles, but also by the intertemporal substitution of leisure, as embodied in
25Note that this equation does not hold exactly when individuals value bequests.
31the labor supply proﬁles.26 Models of labor supply and savings, such as MaCurdy (1981) or
French (2005), often suggest that agents are very patient.
Another important parameter is ν, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for ﬂow utility.
A more familiar measure of risk aversion is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for con-
sumption. Assuming that labor supply is ﬁxed, it can be approximated as −
(∂2U/∂C2)C
∂U/∂C =
−(γ(1 − ν) − 1). As we move across preference types, the coeﬃcient increases from 3.8 to
5.0 to 6.9. These values are within the range of estimates found in recent studies by Cagetti
(2003) and French (2005), but they are larger than the values of 1.07, 1.81, and 0.960-0.989
reported by Rust and Phelan (1997), Blau and Gilleskie (2006a), and Blau and Gilleskie
(2006b) respectively, in their studies of retirement.
The consumption ﬂoor cmin and ν are identiﬁed in large part by the asset quantiles, which
reﬂect precautionary motives. The bottom quantile in particular depends on the interaction of
precautionary motives and the consumption ﬂoor. If the consumption ﬂoor is suﬃciently low,
the risk of a catastrophic health cost shock, which over a lifetime could equal over $100,000
(see French and Jones (2004a)), can generate strong precautionary incentives. Conversely,
as emphasized by Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995), a high consumption ﬂoor discourages
saving among the poor, since the consumption ﬂoor eﬀectively imposes a 100% tax for those
with high medical expenses and low income and assets.
Our estimated consumption ﬂoor of $4,118 is similar to other estimates of social insur-
ance transfers for the indigent. Using Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes’s (1994, Appendix A)
procedures and more recent data, we found that the average beneﬁts available to a childless
household with no members aged 65 or older was $3,500.27 A value of $3,500 understates
the beneﬁts available to older individuals; in 1998 the Federal SSI beneﬁt for elderly (65+)
couples was nearly $9,000 (Committee on Ways and Means, 2000, p. 229). On the other
26This restriction is often relaxed by adding a time trend to leisure- (or consumption-) related utility
parameters. See, e.g., Rust and Phelan, 1997, Blau and Gilleskie, 2006a and 2006b, and Gustman and
Steinmeier, 2005, Rust et al., 2003, van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2006.
27Our treatment of the consumption ﬂoor diﬀers markedly from that of Rust and Phelan (1997) and Blau and
Gilleskie (2006a, 2006b), who simply impose a penalty when an individual’s implied consumption is negative.
Although Rust and Phelan’s estimates do not translate into a consumption ﬂoor, they ﬁnd the penalty to be
large, implying a fairly low ﬂoor.
32hand, about half of eligible households do not collect SSI beneﬁts (Elder and Powers, 2006,
Table 2), possibly because transactions or “stigma” costs outweigh the value of public assis-
tance. Low take-up rates, along with the costs that probably underly them, suggest that the
eﬀective consumption ﬂoor need not equal statutory beneﬁts.
The bequest parameters θB and κ are identiﬁed largely from the top asset quantile. It
follows from equation (3) that when the shift parameter κ is large, the marginal utility of
bequests will be lower than the marginal utility of consumption unless the individual is rich.
In other words, the bequest motive mainly aﬀects the saving of the rich; for more on this
point, see De Nardi (2004). Our estimate of θB implies that the marginal propensity to
consume out of wealth in the ﬁnal period of life (which is a nonlinear function of θB, β, γ, ν
and κ) is 1 for low income individuals and 0.032 for high-income individuals.
Turning to labor supply, we ﬁnd that individuals in our sample are willing to intertem-
porally substitute their work hours. In particular, simulating the eﬀects of a 2% wage
change reveals that the wage elasticity of average hours is 0.535 at age 60. This relatively
high labor supply elasticity arises because the ﬁxed cost of work generates volatility on the
participation margin. The participation elasticity is 0.404 at age 60, implying that wage
changes cause relatively small hours changes for workers. For example, the Frisch labor





The ﬁxed cost of work, φP, is identiﬁed by the life cycle proﬁle of hours worked by workers.
Average hours of work (available upon request) do not drop below 1,000 hours per year (or
20 hours per week, 50 weeks per year) even though labor force participation rates decline
to near zero. In the absence of a ﬁxed cost of work, one would expect hours worked to
parallel the decline in labor force participation. The time endowment L is identiﬁed by the
combination of the participation and hours proﬁles. The time cost of bad health, φM, is
identiﬁed by noting that unhealthy individuals work fewer hours than healthy individuals,
even after conditioning on wages. 28
28In the current speciﬁcation, we have not imposed any re-entry costs. Adding previous employment as
336.2 Simulated Proﬁles
The bottom of Table 4 displays overidentiﬁcation test statistics; the two diﬀer because
we use a diagonal weighting matrix (see Appendix E). Even though the model is formally
rejected, the life cycle proﬁles generated by the model for the most part resemble the life
cycle proﬁles generated by the data.
Figure 4: Asset Quantiles, Data and Simulations
Figure 4 shows that the model ﬁts both asset quantiles fairly well. The model is able to
ﬁt the lower quantile in large part because of the consumption ﬂoor of $4,118; the predicted
lower asset quantile rises dramatically when the consumption ﬂoor is lowered. This result
is consistent with Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995). They show that if the government
guarantees a minimum consumption level, those with low income will tend not to save because
their savings will reduce the transfers they receive from the government. It is therefore not
surprising that within the model the consumption ﬂoor reduces saving by individuals with
low income and assets.
The three panels in the left hand column of Figure 5 show that the model is able to
replicate the two key features of how labor force participation varies with age and health
a state variable doubles the computational burden, and the current speciﬁcation matches observed re-entry
patterns very well.
34insurance. The ﬁrst key feature is that participation declines with age, and the declines are
especially sharp between ages 62 and 65. The model is also able to match the aggregate
decline in participation at age 65 (a 5.3 percentage point decline in the data versus a 5.8
percentage point decline predicted by the model), although it underpredicts the decline in
participation at 62 (a 10.6 percentage point decline in the data versus a 3.5 percentage point
decline predicted by the model). We return to the age-62 decline in participation below.
The second key feature is that there are large diﬀerences in participation and job exit rates
across health insurance types. The model does a good job of replicating observed diﬀerences
in participation rates. For example, the model matches the low participation levels of the
uninsured. Turning to the lower left panel of Figure 6, the data show that the group with the
lowest participation rates are the uninsured with low assets. The model is able to replicate
this fact because of the consumption ﬂoor. Without a high consumption ﬂoor, the risk of
catastrophic medical expenses, in combination with risk aversion, would cause the uninsured
to remain in the labor force and accumulate a buﬀer stock of assets.
The panels in the right hand column of Figure 5 compare observed and simulated job
exit rates for each health insurance type. They show that the model correctly predicts that
workers with retiree coverage and no health insurance have fairly high exit rates after age 62.
In contrast, the model under-predicts exit for workers with tied health insurance.29
29The low predicted exit rates for those with tied coverage reﬂects our assumption that once an elderly
worker with tied coverage leaves his job, he will never have a job with tied coverage again.
35Figure 5: Participation and Job Exit Rates, Data and Simulations
36Figure 6: Labor Force Participation Rates by Asset Grouping, Data and Simulations
37Figure 7 shows how participation diﬀers across the three values of our discretized prefer-
ence index. The model does a good job of replicating the observed diﬀerences in participation.
Recall that an index value of out implies that the individual was not working in 1992. Not
surprisingly, participation for this group is always low. Individuals with positive values of
the preference index diﬀer primarily in the rate at which they leave the labor force, i.e., the
slopes of their participation proﬁles. As noted in our discussion of the preference parameters,
the model replicates these diﬀerences allowing for variation in leisure preferences and the
discount rate across preference types.
Figure 7: Labor Force Participation Rates by Preference Index, Data and Simulations
6.3 The Eﬀects of Employer-Provided Health Insurance
The empirical proﬁles discussed above are informative, but do not identify the eﬀects of
health insurance on retirement, for three reasons. First, as shown in Table 3, the distributions
of wages and wealth in our sample diﬀer across health insurance types. For example, those
with retiree coverage have greater pension wealth than other groups. Second, as shown
in Figure 1, pension plans for workers with retiree coverage provide stronger incentives for
early retirement than the pension plans held by other groups. Third, preferences for leisure
potentially vary by health insurance type. Therefore, retirement incentives diﬀer across health
insurance categories for reasons unrelated to health insurance incentives.
38To isolate the eﬀects of employer-provided health insurance, we conduct some additional
simulations. Using our baseline speciﬁcation, we ﬁx pension accrual rates so that they are
identical across health insurance types. We then simulate the model three times, assuming
ﬁrst that all workers have no health insurance, then retiree coverage, then tied coverage at
age 59.
This exercise reveals that the job exit rate at age 60 would be 2.6 percentage points higher
if all workers had retiree coverage rather than tied coverage. The gap is 3.8 percentage points
at age 61 and 3.2 percentage points at age 62, then declines slightly to 1.0 percentage points at
age 65. These diﬀerences in exit rates across health insurance types are smaller than the raw
diﬀerences in exit rates observed in the data (see Section 5) and the raw diﬀerences predicted
by the model. Such results are consistent with Tables 3 and 5, which show that workers with
retiree coverage have more generous pension plans and stronger preferences for leisure than
those with tied coverage. Failing to account for these eﬀects will lead the econometrician to
overstate the eﬀect of health insurance on exit rates.
The eﬀect of health insurance can also be measured by comparing participation rates. We
ﬁnd that the labor force participation rate for ages 60-67 would be 6.0 percentage points lower
if workers had retiree, rather than tied, coverage at age 59. Much of this diﬀerence is due
to an immediate, 4.7-percentage-point drop in participation at age 59, when the simulations
begin—the main eﬀect of retiree coverage is to encourage early retirement—but there is still
a signiﬁcant eﬀect at later years. Yet another way to measure the eﬀect of health insurance
is consider the retirement age, deﬁned here as the oldest age at which the individual worked.
Moving from retiree to tied coverage increases the average retirement age by 0.41 years.
A useful comparison appears in the reduced form model of Blau and Gilleskie (2001),
who study labor market behavior between ages 51 and 62 using waves 1 and 2 of the HRS
data. They ﬁnd that having retiree coverage, as opposed to tied coverage, increases the job
exit rate around 1% at age 54 and 7.5% at age 61. In contrast to our results, they ﬁnd that
accounting for selection into health insurance plans modestly increases the estimated eﬀect of
health insurance on exit rates. Other reduced form ﬁndings in the literature are qualitatively
39similar to Blau and Gilleskie. For example, Madrian (1994) ﬁnds that retiree coverage reduces
the retirement age by 0.4-1.2 years, depending on the speciﬁcation and the data employed.
Karoly and Rogowski (1994), who attempt to account for selection into health insurance
plans, ﬁnd that retiree coverage increases the job exit rate 8 percentage points over a 21
2 year
period. Our estimates, therefore, lie within the range established by previous reduced form
studies, giving us conﬁdence that the model can be used for policy analysis.
Structural studies that omit medical expense risk usually ﬁnd smaller health insurance
eﬀects than we do. For example, Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) ﬁnd that retiree coverage
reduces years in the labor force by 0.1 year. Lumsdaine et al. (1994) ﬁnd even smaller eﬀects.
In contrast, structural studies that include medical expense risk but omit self-insurance usu-
ally ﬁnd eﬀects that are at least as large as ours. Our estimated eﬀects are larger than Blau
and Gilleskie’s (2006a, 2006b), who ﬁnd that retiree coverage reduces average participation
1.7 and 1.6 percentage points, respectively,30 but are smaller than the eﬀects found by Rust
and Phelan (1997).
6.4 Model Validation
In order to better understand whether structural models produce accurate predictions,
it has become increasingly common to subject them to out-of-sample validation exercises
(see, e.g., Keane and Wolpin, 2006, and the references therein). Recall that we estimate
the model on a cohort of individuals aged 57-61 in 1992. We test our model by considering
the HRS cohort aged 51-55 in 1992; we refer to this cohort as our validation sample. These
individuals faced diﬀerent Social Security incentives than did the estimation cohort. The
validation sample did not face the Social Security earnings test after age 65, had a slightly later
full retirement age, and faced a beneﬁt adjustment formula that more strongly encouraged
30Blau and Gilleskie (2006a) consider the retirement decision of couples, and allow husbands and wives to
retire at diﬀerent dates. Blau and Gilleskie (2006b) allow workers to choose their medical expenses. Because
these modiﬁcations provide additional mechanisms for smoothing consumption over medical expense shocks,
they could reduce the eﬀect of employer-provided health insurance. Furthermore, eliminating the ability to
save reduces a worker’s willingness to substitute labor across time; as current consumption becomes more
closely linked to current earnings, labor supply becomes less ﬂexible. Domeij and Floden (2006) ﬁnd that
borrowing constraints reduce the eﬀective intertemporal elasticity of substitution by 50 percent.
40delayed retirement. In addition to facing diﬀerent Social Security rules, the validation sample
possessed diﬀerent endowments of wages, wealth, and employer beneﬁts. A valuable test of
our model, therefore, is to see if it can predict the behavior of the validation sample.
Data Model
1933 1939 Diﬀerence 1933 1939 Diﬀerence
Age (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
60 0.694 0.700 0.006 0.621 0.654 0.033
61 0.656 0.652 -0.003 0.589 0.619 0.030
62 0.551 0.549 -0.002 0.554 0.574 0.021
63 0.487 0.509 0.023 0.522 0.537 0.016
64 0.433 0.475 0.042 0.484 0.501 0.017
65 0.379 0.427 0.048 0.426 0.444 0.018
66 0.338 0.429 0.091 0.370 0.400 0.030
67 0.327 0.484 0.157 0.338 0.343 0.005
Total, 60-65 3.198 3.312 0.114 3.195 3.330 0.135
Total, 60-67 3.863 4.225 0.362 3.903 4.073 0.171
Table 6: Participation Rates by Birth Year Cohort
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 6 show the participation rates observed in the data for each
cohort, and the diﬀerence. The data suggest that the change in the Social Security rules
coincides with increased labor force participation, especially at later ages. The estimated
increase in labor supply at ages 62-65 is similar, and the estimated increase at ages 66-67
larger than the increases in labor supply reported in Song and Manchester (2007).31
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 6 show the diﬀerences predicted by the model. The simulations
for the validation sample use the initial distribution observed for the validation cohort, but
use the decision rules estimated on the older estimation cohort.32 Comparing Columns (3)
and (6) shows that although the model does not always match the data year-by-year, it
predicts that total labor supply over ages 60-65 will increase by 0.135 years, compared to the
diﬀerence of 0.114 years years in the data. We conclude that the model does a good job of
ﬁtting the data out of sample.
31Our participation rates for ages 66 and 67 are imprecisely estimated because at later ages we observe a
decreasing fraction of the validation sample; at age 66, for example, we observe only the individuals born in
1937 and 1938—roughly two ﬁfths of the sample—and at age 67 we observe only the individuals born in 1937.
32We do not adjust for business cycle conditions.
417 Policy Experiments
The preceding section showed that the model ﬁts the data very well, given plausible
preference parameters. In this section, we use the model to predict how changing the Social
Security and Medicare rules would aﬀect retirement behavior. In particular, we increase both
the normal Social Security retirement age and the Medicare eligibility age from 65 to 67, and
measure the resulting changes in simulated work hours and exit rates. The results of these
experiments are summarized in Table 7.
1998 rules: 2030 rules:
SS = 65 SS = 67 SS = 65 SS = 67
MC = 65 MC = 65 MC = 67 MC = 67 Data
Age (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
60 0.621 0.628 0.624 0.633 0.694
61 0.589 0.597 0.594 0.602 0.656
62 0.554 0.559 0.558 0.566 0.550
63 0.522 0.527 0.527 0.534 0.487
64 0.484 0.492 0.491 0.499 0.432
65 0.426 0.435 0.445 0.454 0.379
66 0.370 0.401 0.389 0.416 0.338
67 0.338 0.355 0.342 0.358 0.327
Total 60-67 3.903 3.994 3.971 4.062 3.863
SS = Social Security normal retirement age
MC = Medicare eligibility age
Table 7: Effects of Changing the Social Security Retirement and Medicare Eligibil-
ity Ages: Baseline Specification
The ﬁrst column of Table 7 shows model-predicted labor market participation at ages 60
through 67 under the 1998 Social Security rules. Under the 1998 rules, the average person
works a total of 3.90 years over this eight-year period. The ﬁfth column of Table 7 shows
that this is close to the total of 3.86 years observed in the data.
The second column shows the average hours that result when the 1998 Social Security rules
are replaced with the rules planned for the year 2030. Imposing the 2030 rules: (1) increases
the normal Social Security retirement age, the date at which the worker can receive “full
beneﬁts”, from 65 to 67; (2) signiﬁcantly increases the credit rates for deferring retirement
past the normal age; and (3) eliminates the earnings test for workers at the normal retirement
42age or older. The second column shows that imposing the 2030 rules leads the average worker
to increase years worked between ages 60 and 67 from 3.90 years to 3.99 years, an increase
of 0.09 years.33
The third column of Table 7 shows participation when the Medicare eligibility age is
increased to 67.34 This change increases total years of work by 0.07 years. Averaged over an
8-year interval, a 0.07-year increase in total years of work translates into a 0.9-percentage-
point increase in annual participation rates. This amount is larger than the changes found by
Blau and Gilleskie (2006a), whose simulations show that increasing the Medicare age reduces
the average probability of non-employment by about 0.1 percentage points, but is smaller
than the eﬀects suggested by Rust and Phelan’s (1997) analysis. The fourth column shows
the combined eﬀect of raising both the Social Security retirement and the Medicare eligibility
age. The joint eﬀect is an increase of 0.16 years, 0.07 more than that generated by raising
the Social Security normal retirement age in isolation.
In short, the model predicts that raising the normal Social Security retirement age will
have a slightly larger eﬀect on retirement behavior than increasing the Medicare eligibility
age. One reason that Social Security has larger labor market eﬀects than Medicare is that
most workers in our sample do not have tied coverage at age 59.35 Medicare provides smaller
retirement incentives to workers in the retiree or none categories. Simulations reveal that
for those with tied coverage at age 60, shifting forward the Social Security age to 67 increases
33In addition to changing the beneﬁt accrual rate, raising the normal retirement age from 65 to 67 eﬀec-
tively eliminates two years of Social Security beneﬁts. Therefore, raising the normal retirement age has both
substitution and wealth eﬀects, both of which cause participation to increase. To measure the size of the
wealth eﬀect, we raise the retirement age to 67 while increasing annual beneﬁts at every age by 15.4%. The
net eﬀect of these two changes is to alter the Social Security incentive structure while keeping the present
value of Social Security wealth (at any age) roughly equivalent to the age-65 level. Using this conﬁguration
to eliminate wealth eﬀects, we ﬁnd that total years of work increase by 0.048 years, implying that 0.043 years
of the 0.091-year increase is due to wealth eﬀects.
34By shifting forward the Medicare eligibility age to 67, we increase from 65 to 67 the age at which medical
expenses can follow the “with Medicare” distribution shown in Table 1.
35Only 13% of the workers in our sample had tied coverage at age 59. This ﬁgure, however, is probably too
low. For example, Kaiser/HRET (2006) estimates that about 50% of large ﬁrms oﬀered tied coverage in the
mid-1990s. One potential reason that we may be understating the share with tied coverage is that, as shown
in the Kaiser/HRET (2006) study, the fraction of workers with tied (instead of retiree) coverage grew rapidly
in the 1990s, and our health insurance measure is based on wave-1 data collected 1992. In fact, the HRS data
indicate that later waves had a higher proportion of individuals with tied coverage than in wave 1. We may
also be understating the share with tied coverage because of changes in the wording of the HRS questionnaire;
see Appendix G for details.
43years in the labor force by 0.09 years, whereas shifting forward the Medicare eligibility age
to 67 would increase years in the labor force by 0.11 years.
To understand better the incentives generated by Medicare, we compute the value that
Type-1 individuals place on employer-provided health insurance, by ﬁnding the increase in as-
sets that would make an uninsured Type-1 individual as well oﬀ as a person with retiree cover-
age. In particular, we ﬁnd the compensating variation λt = λ(At,Bt,Mt,AIMEt,ωt,ζt−1,t),
where
Vt(At,Bt,Mt,AIMEt,ωt,ζt−1,retiree) = Vt(At + λt,Bt,Mt,AIMEt,ωt,ζt−1,none).
Table 8 shows the compensating variation λ(At,0,good,$32000,0,0,60) at several diﬀerent
asset (At) levels.36 The ﬁrst column of Table 8 shows the valuations found under the baseline
speciﬁcation. One of the most striking features is that the value of employer-provided health
insurance is fairly constant through much of the wealth distribution. Even though richer
individuals can better self-insure, they also receive less protection from the government-
provided consumption ﬂoor. In the baseline case, these eﬀects more or less cancel each other
out over the asset range of -$2,300 to $149,000. However, individuals with asset levels of
$600,000 place less value on retiree coverage, because they can better self-insure against
medical expense shocks.
Part of the value of retiree coverage comes from a reduction in average medical expenses—
because retiree coverage is subsidized—and part comes from a reduction in the volatility of
medical expenses—because it is insurance. In order to separate the former from the latter,
we eliminate health cost uncertainty, by setting the variance shifter σ(Mt,HIt,t,Bt,Pt) to
zero, and recompute λt, using the same state variables and mean medical expenses as before.
Without health cost uncertainty, λt is approximately $19,000. Comparing the two values of
λt shows that for the typical worker (with $150,000 of assets) about one-third of the value
36In making these calculations, we remove health-insurance-speciﬁc diﬀerences in pensions, as described
in section 6.3. It is also worth noting that for the values of Mt and ζt−1 considered here, the conditional
diﬀerences in expected health costs are smaller than the unconditional diﬀerences shown in Table 1.
44Compensating Assets Compensating Annuity
With Without With Without
Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty
Asset Levels (1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Case
-$2,300 $51,150 $18,710 $4,580 $1,970
$54,400 $55,860 $18,700 $4,070 $1,960
$149,000 $57,170 $19,690 $3,980 $1,950
$600,000 $40,000 $19,500 $2,830 $1,780
No-Saving Case
-$2,150 463,700 $28,100 $11,100 $1,910
Compensating variation between retiree and none coverages
Calculations described in text
Baseline results are for agents with type-1 preferences
Table 8: Value of Employer-Provided Health Insurance
of health insurance comes from the reduction of average medical expenses, and two-thirds is
due to the reduction of medical expense volatility.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 8 measure the lifetime value of health insurance as an asset
increment that can be consumed immediately. An alternative approach is to express the value
of health insurance as an illiquid annuity comparable to Social Security beneﬁts. Columns (3)
and (4) show this “compensating annuity”.37 When the value of health insurance is expressed
as an annuity, the fraction of its value attributable to reduced medical expense volatility falls
from two-thirds to about one-half. In most other respects, however, the asset and annuity
valuations of health insurance have similar implications.
To sum, allowing for medical expense uncertainty greatly increases the value of health
insurance. It is therefore unsurprising that we ﬁnd larger eﬀects of health insurance on
retirement than do Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) and Lumsdaine et al. (1994), who assume
that workers value health insurance at its actuarial cost.
37To do this, we ﬁrst ﬁnd compensating AIME,   λt, where
Vt(At,Bt,Mt,AIMEt,ωt,ζt−1,retiree) = Vt(At,Bt,Mt,AIMEt +   λt,ωt,ζt−1,none).
This change in AIME in turn allows us to calculate the change in expected pension and Social Security
beneﬁts that the individual would receive at age 65, the sum of which can be viewed as a compensating
annuity. Because these beneﬁts depend on decisions made after age 60, the calculation is only approximate.
458 Robustness Checks
To consider whether our ﬁndings are sensitive to our modelling assumptions, we re-
estimate the model under three alternate speciﬁcations. Table 9 shows model-predicted
participation rates under the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, along with the data. Column (1) of
Table 9 presents our baseline case. Column (2) presents the case where individuals are not
allowed to save. Column (3) presents the case where housing wealth is illiquid. Column (4)
presents the case with no preference heterogeneity. Column (5) presents the data. In general,
the diﬀerent speciﬁcations generate similar proﬁles.
No Illiquid Homogeneous
Baseline Saving Housing Preferences Data
Age (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
60 0.621 0.605 0.638 0.676 0.695
61 0.589 0.581 0.610 0.639 0.656
62 0.554 0.536 0.498 0.570 0.550
63 0.522 0.512 0.451 0.513 0.486
64 0.484 0.480 0.421 0.464 0.433
65 0.426 0.449 0.426 0.440 0.379
66 0.370 0.406 0.391 0.372 0.339
67 0.338 0.322 0.379 0.367 0.327
Total 60-67 3.903 3.891 3.813 4.041 3.866
Table 9: Robustness Checks
8.1 No Saving
We have argued that the ability to self-insure through saving signiﬁcantly aﬀects the value
of employer-provided health insurance. One test of this hypothesis is to modify the model so
that individuals cannot save, and examine how labor market decisions change. In particular,
we require workers to consume their income net of health costs, as in Rust and Phelan (1997)
and Blau and Gilleskie (2006a, 2006b).
In the absence of saving, β and θB are both very weakly identiﬁed. We therefore follow
Rust and Phelan and Blau and Gilleskie by ﬁxing β, in this case to its baseline values of 0.83,
1.12, and 0.97 (for types 1, 2 and 3, respectively). Similarly, we ﬁx θB to zero. Since the
46asset distribution is degenerate in this no-saving case, we no longer match asset quantiles or
quantile-conditional participation rates, matching instead participation rates for each health
insurance category. The second column of Table 4 shows the parameter estimates for this
speciﬁcation and the second column of Table 9 shows participation rates. The baseline case
ﬁts the labor supply proﬁles slightly better, and obviously ﬁts the asset proﬁles much better,
than the no-savings case.38
The compensating annuity calculations in Table 8 show that eliminating the ability to
save greatly increases the value of retiree coverage: when assets are -$2,000, the compensating
annuity increases from $4,600 in the baseline case (with savings) to $11,100 in the no-savings
case. When there is no health cost uncertainty, the comparable ﬁgures are $1,970 in the
baseline case and $1,910 in the no-savings case. Thus, the ability to self-insure through
saving signiﬁcantly reduces the value of employer-provided health insurance.
Simulating the responses to policy changes, we ﬁnd that raising the Medicare eligibility
age to 67 leads to an additional 0.05 years of work, an amount close to that of the baseline
speciﬁcation. Moving the Social Security normal retirement age to 67 generates an almost
identical response, which is also consistent with the baseline results.
8.2 Illiquid Housing
Although allowing for no savings seems extreme, it has often been argued (e.g., Rust and
Phelan, 1997, Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005) that housing equity is considerably less liquid
than ﬁnancial assets. Since housing comprises a signiﬁcant proportion of most individuals’
assets, its illiquidity would greatly weaken their ability to self-insure through saving.
To account for this possibility, we re-estimate the model using “liquid assets”, which
excludes housing and business wealth.39 The third column of Table 4 contains the revised
38Because the baseline and no-savings cases are estimated with diﬀerent moments, the overidentiﬁcation
statistics shown in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 4 are not comparable. However, inserting the decision
proﬁles generated by the baseline model into the moment conditions used to estimate the no-savings case
produces an overidentiﬁcation statistic of 958, while the no-saving speciﬁcation produces an overidentiﬁcation
statistic of 1,211.
39A complete analysis of illiquid housing would require us to treat housing as an additional state variable,
with its own accumulation dynamics, and to impute the consumption services provided by owner-occupied
47parameter estimates. The most notable changes are: (1) the coeﬃcient of relative risk aver-
sion, ν, drops from 7.5 to 6.5; (2) the type-1 value of β, the discount factor, drops from 1.115
to 0.858; (3) the consumption ﬂoor, cmin, increases from $4,100 to $6,300. All three changes—
lower risk aversion, lower patience and more government protection—help the model ﬁt the
bottom third of liquid asset holdings, which averages less than $5,000.
Column (3) of Table 9 shows participation when housing assets are illiquid. The most no-
table result is that simulated participation drops markedly at age 62. Several authors (Kahn,
1988, Rust and Phelan, 1997, and Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005) have argued that, because
they cannot borrow against their Social Security beneﬁts, many workers that would other-
wise retire earlier cannot fund their retirement before age 62. Making housing illiquid, along
with the large decrease in the estimated value of β, strengthens this eﬀect. The underlying
asset-conditional proﬁles reveal that the participation drop is most pronounced for simulated
workers in the bottom 1/3rd of the asset distribution. This contrasts with the data, where
the age-62 exit rates vary across the asset quantiles to a much smaller extent.
We ﬁnd that in this framework delaying the Medicare eligibility age has a bigger eﬀect
than delaying the Social Security normal retirement age. Shifting forward the Medicare
eligibility age to 67 increases total years in the labor force by 0.11 years (versus the 0.07
years for the baseline speciﬁcation that we presented in Table 7).
8.3 No Preference Heterogeneity
To assess the importance of preference heterogeneity, we estimate and simulate a model
where individuals have identical preferences. The third column of Table 4 contains the revised
parameter estimates. Perhaps the most striking change is the drop in the coeﬃcient of risk
aversion, ν, which falls from 7.5 to 3.9.
Comparing columns (1), (4) and (5) of Table 9 shows that the model without preference
heterogeneity matches aggregate participation rates as well as the baseline model. Underlying
housing. This is not computationally feasible. In this paper, we simply allow these eﬀects to be captured in
the preference parameters.
48results show that the ﬁt is especially good for workers with tied coverage. In the benchmark
speciﬁcation, a high degree of risk aversion (value of ν) makes workers with tied coverage
extremely unwilling to lose their coverage by exiting the labor force; the no-heterogeneity
speciﬁcation, with less risk aversion, predicts a lower level of participation.40 However, the
no-heterogeneity speciﬁcation does much less well in replicating the way in which participation
varies across the asset distribution.41
When preferences are homogenous the simulated response to delaying the Medicare eligi-
bility age, 0.11 years, is larger than the response in the baseline speciﬁcation, and it exceeds
the eﬀect of increasing the Social Security normal retirement age.
9 Conclusion
Prior to age 65, many individuals receive health insurance only if they continue to work.
At age 65, however, Medicare provides health insurance to almost everyone. Therefore, a
potentially important work incentive disappears at age 65. If individuals place a high value
on health insurance, the provision of Medicare beneﬁts may have a large eﬀect on retirement
behavior. To see if this is the case, we construct a retirement model that includes health
insurance, uncertain medical costs, a savings decision, a non-negativity constraint on assets
and a government-provided consumption ﬂoor. Including all these features produces a general
model that can reconcile previous results.
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we estimate the structural parameters
of our model, and then conduct a number of simulation exercises. The model predicts that
workers whose health insurance is tied to their job leave the labor force about 0.41 years later
than workers whose coverage extends into retirement. This result, being similar to reduced
form estimates, gives us conﬁdence in the model. In addition, the model does a good job of
40In addition, Table 5 shows that in the baseline case workers with tied coverage are the ones most likely
to be of preference type 2, the group that values consumption, and thus the returns to work, the most.
41Not surprisingly, the model without preference heterogeneity also fails to replicate participation diﬀerences
across our discretized preference index—we do not even include the index-related moments in the revised GMM
criterion function.
49predicting the behavior of individuals who, by belonging to a younger cohort, faced diﬀerent
Social Security rules than the individuals upon which the model was estimated.
We ﬁnd that health care uncertainty signiﬁcantly aﬀects the value of employer-provided
health insurance. Our calculations suggest that about two thirds of the value workers place on
employer-provided health insurance comes from its ability to reduce medical expense risk. We
also ﬁnd, however, that the ability to save signiﬁcantly reduces the value of health insurance:
when saving is prohibited, the value of insurance doubles.
Our estimates of the labor supply eﬀects of employer-provided health insurance, while
larger than the eﬀects found by Blau and Gilleskie (2006a, 2006b), in general lie between the
small eﬀects found in analyses that omit medical expense risk (Lumsdaine et al., 1994, and
Gustman and Steinmeier, 1994), and the large eﬀects found in analyses that prohibit saving
(Rust and Phelan, 1997). Our model predicts that raising the Medicare eligibility age from
65 to 67 would increase average labor market participation by 0.9 percentage points per year.
This labor supply response is similar to the eﬀect of raising the Social Security retirement
age from 65 to 67. In summary, we ﬁnd that it is important to consider both uncertainty and
savings when evaluating the eﬀect of Medicare on retirement behavior.
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54Appendix A: Taxes
Individuals pay federal, state, and payroll taxes on income. We compute federal taxes on
income net of state income taxes using the Federal Income Tax tables for “Head of Household”
in 1998. We use the standard deduction, and thus do not allow individuals to defer medical
expenses as an itemized deduction. We also use income taxes for the fairly representative
state of Rhode Island (27.5% of the Federal Income Tax level). Payroll taxes are 7.65% up to
a maximum of $68,400, and are 1.45% thereafter. Adding up the three taxes generates the
following level of post tax income as a function of labor and asset income:
Pre-tax Income (Y) Post-Tax Income Marginal Tax Rate
0-6250 0.9235Y 0.0765
6250-40200 5771.88 + 0.7384(Y-6250) 0.2616
40200-68400 30840.56 + 0.5881(Y-40200) 0.4119
68400-93950 47424.98 + 0.6501(Y-68400) 0.3499
93950-148250 64035.03 + 0.6166(Y-93950) 0.3834
148250-284700 97515.41 + 0.5640(Y-148250) 0.4360
284700+ 174474.21 + 0.5239(Y-284700) 0.4761
Table 10: After Tax Income
Appendix B: Pensions
Although the HRS pension data and pension calculator allow one to estimate pension
wealth with a high degree of precision, Bellman’s curse of dimensionality prevents us from
including in our dynamic programming model the full range of pension heterogeneity found
in the data. Thus we thus use the HRS pension data and calculator to construct a simpler
model. The fundamental equation behind our model of pensions is the accumulation equation





(1/st+1)[(1 + r)pwt + pacct − pbt] if living at t + 1
0 otherwise
(15)
where pacct is pension accrual and pbt is pension beneﬁts. Two features of this equation
bear noting. First, a pension is worthless once an individual dies. Therefore, in order to
be actuarially fair, surviving workers must receive an above-market return on their pension
55balances. Dividing through by the survival probability st+1 ensures that the expected value
of pensions E(pwt+1|pwt,pacct,pbt) equals (1 + r)pwt + pacct − pbt. Second, since pension
accrual and pension interest are not directly taxed, the appropriate rate of return on pension
wealth is the pre-tax one. Pension beneﬁts, on the other hand, are included in the income
used to calculate an individual’s income tax liability.
Simulating equation (15) requires us to know pension beneﬁts and pension accrual. We
calculate pension beneﬁts by assuming that at age t, the worker receives the expected pension
beneﬁt
pbt = pft × pbmax
t , (16)
where pbmax
t is the beneﬁt received by individuals actually receiving pensions (given the
earnings history observed at time t) and pft the probability that a person with a pension is
currently drawing pension beneﬁts. We estimate pft as the fraction of respondents who are
covered by a pension that receive pension beneﬁts at each age; the fraction increases fairly
smoothly, except for a 23-percentage-point jump at age 62. To ﬁnd the annuity pbmax
t given
the earnings history at time t (and assuming no further pension accruals so that pacck = 0
for k = t,t + 1,...,T), note ﬁrst that recursively substituting equation (15) and imposing










where S(k,t) = (1/st)
 k
j=t sj gives the probability of surviving to age k, conditional on
having survived to time t. If we assume further that the maximum pension beneﬁt is constant
from time t forward, so that pbmax
k = pbmax









(1 + r)k−tpfk. (19)
56Using equations (16) and (18), pension beneﬁts are thus given by
pbt = pftΓ−1
t pwt. (20)
Next, we assume pension accrual is given by
pacct = α0(HIt,WtHt,t) × WtHt, (21)
where α0(.) is the pension accrual rate as a function of health insurance type, labor income,
and age. We estimate α0(.) in two steps, estimating separately each component of:
α0 = E(pacct|WtHt,HIt,t,pent = 1)Pr(pent = 1|HIt,WtHt) (22)
where pacct is the accrual rate for those with a pension, and pent is a 0-1 indicator equal to 1
if the individual has a pension.
We estimate the ﬁrst component, E(pacct|WtHt,HIt,t,pent = 1), from restricted HRS
pension data. To generate a pension accrual rate for each individual, we combine the pension
data with the HRS pension calculator to estimate the pension wealth that each individual
would have if he left his job at diﬀerent ages. The increase in pension wealth gained by
working one more year is the accrual. Put diﬀerently, if pension beneﬁts are 0 as long as the
worker continues working, it follows from equation (15) that
pacct = st+1pwt+1 − (1 + r)pwt. (23)
It bears noting that the HRS pension data have a high degree of employer- and worker-level
detail, allowing us to estimate pension accrual quite accurately. With accruals in hand, we
then estimate E(pacct|WtHt,HIt,t,pent = 1) on the subset of workers that have a pension
on their current job. We regress accrual rates on a fourth-order age polynomial, indicators
for age greater than 62 or 65, log income, log income interacted with the age variables, health
57insurance indicators, and health insurance indicators interacted with the age variables.
Figure 8 shows estimated pension accrual, by health insurance type and earnings. It
shows that those with retiree coverage have the sharpest declines in pension accrual after age
60. It also shows that once health insurance and the probability of having a pension plan are
accounted for, the eﬀect of income on pension accrual is relatively small. Our estimated age
(but not health insurance) pension accrual rates line up closely with Gustman et al. (1998),
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Pension Accrual Rates, by Age and Health Insurance Type
Figure 8: Pension Accrual Rates for Individuals with Pensions, by Age, Health Insur-
ance Coverage and Earnings
In the second step, we estimate the probability of having a pension, Pr(pent = 1|HIt,WtHt,t),
using unrestricted self-reported data from individuals who are working and are ages 51-55.
The function Pr(pent = 1|HIt,WtHt,t) is estimated as a logistic function of log income,
health insurance indicators, and interactions between log income and health insurance.
Table 11 shows the probability of having diﬀerent types of pensions, conditional on health
insurance. The table shows that only 8% of men with no health insurance have a pension,
but 64% of men with tied coverage and 74% of men with retiree insurance have a pension.
Furthermore, it shows that those with retiree coverage are also the most likely to have deﬁned
beneﬁt (DB) pension plans, which provide the strongest retirement incentives at age 65.
58Probability of Pension Type
Variable No Insurance Retiree Insurance Tied Insurance
Deﬁned Beneﬁt .026 .412 .260
Deﬁned Contribution .050 .172 .270
Both DB and DC .006 .160 .106
Total .082 .744 .636
Number of
Observations 343 955 369
Table 11: Probability of having a pension on the current job, by health insurance
type, working men, age 51-55
Combining the restricted data with the HRS pension calculator also yields initial pension
balances as of 1992. Mean pension wealth in our estimation sample is $93,300. Disaggre-
gating by health insurance type, those with retiree coverage have $129,200, those with tied
coverage have $80,000, and those with none have $18,700. With these starting values, we
can then simulate pension wealth in our dynamic programming model with equation (15),
using equation (21) to estimate pension accrual, and using equation (20) to estimate pension
beneﬁts. Using these equations, it is straightforward to track and record the pension balances
of each simulated individual.
But even though it is straightforward to use equation (15) when computing pension wealth
in the simulations, it is too computationally burdensome to include pension wealth as a
separate state variable when computing the decision rules. Our approach is to impute pension
wealth as a function of age and AIME. In particular, we impute a worker’s annual pension
beneﬁts as a function of his Social Security beneﬁts:
  pbt(PIAt,HIt−1,t) =
 
k
γ0,k,t1{HIt−1 = k} + γ3PIAt + (24)
γ4,t max{0,PIAt − 9,999.6} + γ5,t max{0,PIAt − 14,359.9},
where PIAt is the Social Security beneﬁt the worker would get if he were drawing beneﬁts at
time t; as shown in Appendix C below, PIA is a simple monotonic function of AIME. Using
equations (18) and (24) yields imputed pension wealth,   pwt = Γt   pbt. The coeﬃcients of this
equation were estimated with regressions on simulated data generated by the model, with
59age eﬀects captured by interacting the health insurance and PIA variables with a quadratic
polynomial in age. Since these simulated data depend on the γ’s—  pwt aﬀects the decision
rules used in the simulations—the γ’s solve a ﬁxed-point problem. Fortunately, estimates of
the γ’s converge after a few iterations.
This imputation process raises two complications. The ﬁrst is that we use a diﬀerent
pension wealth imputation formula when calculating decision rules than we do in the simula-
tions. If an individual’s time-t pension wealth is   pwt, his time-t+1 pension wealth (if living)
should be
    pwt+1 = (1/st+1)[(1 + r)  pwt + pacct − pbt].
This quantity, however, might diﬀer from the pension wealth that would be imputed using
PIAt+1,   pwt+1 = Γt+1   pbt+1 where   pbt+1 is deﬁned in equation (24). To correct for this, we
increase non-pension wealth, At+1, by st+1(1 − τt)(    pwt+1 −   pwt+1). The ﬁrst term in this
expression reﬂects the fact that while non-pension assets can be bequeathed, pension wealth
cannot. The second term, 1−τt, reﬂects the fact that pension wealth is a pre-tax quantity—
pension beneﬁts are more or less wholly taxable—while non-pension wealth is post-tax—taxes
are levied only on interest income.
A second problem is that while an individual’s Social Security application decision aﬀects
his annual Social Security beneﬁts, it should not aﬀect his pension beneﬁts. (Recall that we
reduce PIA if an individual draws beneﬁts before age 65.) The pension imputation procedure
we use, however, would imply that it does. We counter this problem by recalculating PIA
when the individual begins drawing Social Security beneﬁts. In particular, suppose that a
decision to accelerate or defer application changes PIAt to remtPIAt. Our approach is to
use equation (24) ﬁnd a value PIA∗
t such that
(1 − τt)  pbt(PIA∗
t) + PIA∗
t = (1 − τt)  pbt(PIAt) + remtPIAt,
so that the change in the sum of PIA and imputed after-tax pension income equals just the
change in PIA, i.e., (1 − remt)PIAt.
60Appendix C: Computation of AIME
We model several key aspects of Social Security beneﬁts. First, Social Security beneﬁts
are based on the individual’s 35 highest earnings years, relative to average wages in the
economy during those years. The average earnings over these 35 highest earnings years are
called Average Indexed Monthly Earnings, or AIME. It immediately follows that working
an additional year increases the AIME of an individual with less than 35 years of work.
If an individual has already worked 35 years, he can still increase his AIME by working an
additional year, but only if his current earnings are higher than the lowest earnings embedded
in his current AIME. To account for real wage growth, earnings in earlier years are inﬂated
by the growth rate of average earnings in the overall economy. For the period 1992-1999,
real wage growth, g, had an average value of 0.016 (Committee on Ways and Means, 2000,
p. 923). This indexing stops at the year the worker turns 60, however, and earnings accrued
after age 60 are not rescaled.42 Third, AIME is capped. In 1998, the base year for the
analysis, the maximum AIME level was $68,400.
Precisely modelling these mechanics would require us to keep track of a worker’s entire
earnings history, which is computationally infeasible. As an approximation, we assume that
(for workers beneath the maximum) annualized AIME is given by






0, WtHt − αt(1 + g × 1{t ≤ 60})AIMEt
 
,
where the parameter αt approximates the ratio of the lowest earnings year to AIME. We
assume that 20% of the workers enter the labor force each year between ages 21 and 25, so that
αt = 0 for workers aged 55 and younger. For workers aged 60 and older, earnings only update
AIMEt if current earnings replace the lowest year of earnings, so we estimate αt by simulating
wage (not earnings) histories with the model developed in French (2003), calculating the
sequence
 
1{time-t earnings do not increase AIMEt}
 
t≥60 for each simulated wage history,
42After age 62, nominal beneﬁts increase at the rate of inﬂation.
61and estimating αt as the average of this indicator at each age. Linear interpolation yields α56
through α59.
AIME is converted into a Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) using the formula
PIAt =

    
    
0.9 × AIMEt ifAIMEt < $5,724
$5,151.6 + 0.32 × (AIMEt − 5,724) if$5,724 ≤ AIMEt < $34,500
$14,359.9 + 0.15 × (AIMEt − 34,500) ifAIMEt ≥ $34,500
.
(26)
Social Security beneﬁts sst depend both upon the age at which the individual ﬁrst receives
Social Security beneﬁts and the Primary Insurance Amount. For example, pre-Earnings Test
beneﬁts for a Social Security beneﬁciary will be equal to PIA if the individual ﬁrst receives
beneﬁts at age 65. For every year before age 65 the individual ﬁrst draws beneﬁts, beneﬁts
are reduced by 6.67% and for every year (up until age 70) that beneﬁt receipt is delayed,
beneﬁts increase by 5.0%. The eﬀects of early or late application can be modelled as changes
in AIME rather than changes in PIA, eliminating the need to include age at application as a
state variable. For example, if an individual begins drawing beneﬁts at age 62, his adjusted
AIME must result in a PIA that is only 80% of the PIA he would have received had he ﬁrst
drawn beneﬁts at age 65. Using equation (26), this is easy to ﬁnd.
Appendix D: Numerical Methods
Because the model has no closed form solution, the decision rules it generates must be
found numerically. We ﬁnd the decision rules using value function iteration, starting at time
T and working backwards to time 1. We ﬁnd the time-T decisions by maximizing equation
(14) at each value of XT, with VT+1 = b(AT+1). This yields decision rules for time T and the
value function VT. We next ﬁnd the decision rules at time T − 1 by solving equation (14),
having solved for VT already. Continuing this backwards induction yields decision rules for
times T −2,T −3,...,1. The value function is directly computed at a ﬁnite number of points
within a grid, {Xi}I
i=1;43 We use linear interpolation within the grid and linear extrapolation
43In practice, the grid consists of: 32 asset states, Ah ∈ [−$55,000,$1,200,000]; 5 wage residual states,
62outside of the grid to evaluate the value function at points that we do not directly compute.
Because changes in assets and AIME are likely to cause larger behavioral responses at low
levels of assets and AIME, the grid is more ﬁnely discretized in this region.
At time t, wages, medical expenses and assets at time t + 1 will be random variables.
To capture uncertainty over the persistent components of medical expenses and wages, we
convert ζt and ωt+1 into discrete Markov chains, following the approach of Tauchen (1986);
using discretization rather than quadrature greatly reduces the number of times one has to
interpolate when calculating Et(V (Xt+1)). We integrate the value function with respect to
the transitory component of medical expenses, ξt, using 5-node Gauss-Hermite quadrature
(see Judd, 1999).
Because of the ﬁxed time cost of work and the discrete beneﬁt application decision, the
value function need not be globally concave. This means that we cannot ﬁnd a worker’s opti-
mal consumption and hours with fast hill climbing algorithms. Our approach is to discretize
the consumption and labor supply decision space and to search over this grid. Experimenting
with the ﬁneness of the grids suggested that the grids we used produced reasonable approxi-
mations.44 In particular, increasing the number of grid points seemed to have a small eﬀect
on the computed decision rules.
We then use the decision rules to generate simulated time series. Given the realized state
vector Xi0, individual i’s realized decisions at time 0 are found by evaluating the time-0
decision functions at Xi0. Using the transition functions given by equations (4) through (13),
ωi ∈ [−0.99,0.99]; 16 AIME states, AIMEj ∈ [$4,000,$68,400]; 3 states for the persistent component of
health costs, ζk, over a normalized (unit variance) interval of [−1.5,1.5]. There are also two application states
and two health states. This requires solving the value function at 30,720 diﬀerent points for ages 62-69, when
the individual is eligible to apply for beneﬁts, at 15,630 points before age 62 (when application is not an
option) or at ages 70-71 (when we impose application), and at 7,680 points after age 71 (when we impose
retirement as well).
44The consumption grid has 100 points, and the hours grid is broken into 500-hour intervals. When this grid
is used, the consumption search at a value of the state vector X for time t is centered around the consumption
gridpoint that was optimal for the same value of X at time t+1. (Recall that we solve the model backwards in
time.) If the search yields a maximizing value near the edge of the search grid, the grid is reoriented and the
search continued. We begin our search for optimal hours at the level of hours that sets the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure equal to the wage. We then try 6 diﬀerent hours choices in the
neighborhood of the initial hours guess. Because of the ﬁxed cost of work, we also evaluate the value function
at Ht = 0, searching around the consumption choice that was optimal when Ht+1 = 0. Once these values are
found, we perform a quick, “second-pass” search in a neighborhood around them.
63we combine Xi0, the time-0 decisions, and the individual i’s time-1 shocks to get the time-1
state vector, Xi1. Continuing this forward induction yields a life cycle history for individual
i. When Xit does not lie exactly on the state grid, we use interpolation or extrapolation
to calculate the decision rules. This is true for ζt and ωt as well. While these processes
are approximated as ﬁnite Markov chains when the decision rules are found, the simulated
sequences of ζt and ωt are generated from continuous processes. This makes the simulated life
cycle proﬁles less sensitive to the discretization of ζt and ωt than when ζt and ωt are drawn
from Markov chains.
Appendix E: Moment Conditions and the Asymptotic Distribution of Pa-
rameter Estimates
We assume that the “true” preference vector θ0 lies in the interior of the compact set
Θ ⊂ R7. Our estimate, ˆ θ, is the value of θ that minimizes the (weighted) distance between
the estimated life cycle proﬁles for assets, hours, and participation found in the data and the
simulated proﬁles generated by the model. We match 21T moment conditions. They are,
for each age t ∈ {1,...,T}, two asset quantiles (forming 2T moment conditions), labor force
participation rates conditional on asset quantile and health insurance type (9T), labor market
exit rates for each health insurance type (3T), labor force participation rates conditional on
the preference indicator described in the main text (3T), and labor force participation rates
and mean hours worked conditional upon health status (4T).
Consider ﬁrst the asset quantiles. As stated in the main text, let j ∈ {1,2,...,J} index
asset quantiles, where J is the total number of asset quantiles. Assuming that the age-
conditional distribution of assets is continuous, the πj-th age-conditional quantile of measured






In other words, the fraction of age-t individuals with less than Qπj in assets is πj. Therefore,
Qπj(Ait,t) is the data analog to gπj(t;θ0,χ0), the model-predicted quantile. As is well known
64(see, e.g., Manski, 1988, Powell, 1994 or Buchinsky, 1998; or the review in Chernozhukov and
Hansen, 2002), the preceding equation can be rewritten as a moment condition. In particular,







If the model is true then the data quantile in equation (27) can be replaced by the model
quantile, and equation (27) can be rewritten as:
E
 
1{Ait ≤ gπj(t;θ0,χ0)} − πj|t
 
= 0, j ∈ {1,2,...,J}, t ∈ {1,...,T}. (28)
Since J = 2, equation (28) generates 2T moment conditions. We compute gπj(t;θ,χ) by
ﬁnding the model’s decision rules for consumption, hours, and beneﬁt application, using the
decision rules to generate artiﬁcial histories for many diﬀerent simulated individuals, and
ﬁnding the quantiles of the collected histories.
Equation (28) is a departure from the usual practice of minimizing a sum of weighted
absolute errors in quantile estimation. The quantile restrictions just described, however, are
part of a larger set of moment conditions, which means that we can no longer estimate θ by
minimizing weighted absolute errors. Our approach to handling multiple quantiles is similar
to the minimum distance framework used by Epple and Seig (1999).45
The next set of moment conditions uses the quantile-conditional means of labor force
participation. Let Pj(HI,t;θ0,χ0) denote the model’s prediction of labor force participation
given asset quantile interval j, health insurance type HI, and age t. If the model is true,
Pj(HI,t;θ0,χ0) should equal the conditional participation rates found in the data:
Pj(HI,t;θ0,χ0) = E[Pit | HI,t,gπj−1(t;θ0,χ0) ≤ Ait ≤ gπj(t;θ0,χ0)], (29)
45Buchinsky (1998) shows that one could include the ﬁrst-order conditions from multiple absolute value
minimization problems in the moment set. However, his approach involves ﬁnding the gradient of gπj(t;θ,χ)
at each step of the minimization search.
65with π0 = 0 and πJ+1 = 1. Using indicator function notation, we can convert this conditional
moment equation into an unconditional one:
E([Pit − Pj(HI,t;θ0,χ0)] × 1{HIit = HI}
× 1{gπj−1(t;θ0,χ0) ≤ Ait ≤ gπj(t;θ0,χ0)} | t) = 0, (30)
for j ∈ {1,2,...,J + 1}, HI ∈ {none,retiree,tied}, t ∈ {1,...,T}. Note that gπ0(t) ≡ −∞
and gπJ+1(t) ≡ ∞. With 2 quantiles (generating 3 quantile-conditional means) and 3 health
insurance types, equation (29) generates 9T moment conditions.
The HRS asks workers about their willingness to work and/or their expectations about
working in the future. We combine the answers to these questions into a time-invariant index,
pref ∈ {high,low,out}. Because labor force participation diﬀers signiﬁcantly across values
of pref, and because pref signiﬁcantly improves reduced-form predictions of employment,
we interpret this index as a measure of otherwise unobserved preferences toward work. This
leads to the following moment condition:
E
 
Pit − P(pref,t;θ0,χ0) | prefi = pref,t
 
= 0, (31)
for t ∈ {1,...,T}, pref ∈ {0,1,2}. Equation (31) yields 3T moment conditions, which are
converted into unconditional moment equations with indicator functions.
We also match exit rates for each health insurance category. Let EX(HI,t;θ0,χ0) denote




[1 − Pit] − EX(HI,t;θ0,χ0 | HIi,60 = HI,Pi,t−1 = 1,t
 
= 0, (32)
[1 − Pit]  = Prob(P = 0|Pt−1 = 1)] for HI ∈ {none,retiree,tied}, t ∈ {1,...,T}. Equation
(32) generates 3T moment conditions, which are converted into unconditional moments as
66well.46
Finally, consider health-conditional hours and participation. Let lnH(M,t;θ0,χ0) and
P(M,t;θ0,χ0) denote the conditional expectation functions for hours (when working) and
participation generated by the model for workers with health status M; let lnHit and Pit
denote measured hours and participation. The moment conditions are
E
 





Pit − P(M,t;θ0,χ0) | Mit = M,t
 
= 0, (34)
for t ∈ {1,...,T}, M ∈ {0,1}. Equations (33) and (34), once again converted into uncondi-
tional form, yield 4T moment conditions, for a grand total of 21T moment conditions.
Combining all the moment conditions described here is straightforward: we simply stack
the moment conditions and estimate jointly.
Suppose we have a data set of I independent individuals that are each observed for T
periods. Let ϕ(θ;χ0) denote the 21T-element vector of moment conditions that was described
in the main text and immediately above, and let ˆ ϕI(.) denote its sample analog. Note that
we can extend our results to an unbalanced panel, as we must do in the empirical work, by
simply allowing some of the individual’s contributions to ϕ(.) to be “missing”, as in French






ˆ ϕI(θ,χ0)′  WI ˆ ϕI(θ,χ0),
where τ is the ratio of the number of observations to the number of simulated observations.
Under the regularity conditions stated in Pakes and Pollard (1989) and Duﬃe and Single-
46Because exit rates apply only to those working in the previous period, they normally do not contain the
same information as participation rates. However, this is not the case for workers with tied coverage, as
a worker stays in the tied category only as long as he continues to work. To remove this redundancy, the
exit rates in equation (32) are conditioned on the individual’s age-60 health insurance coverage, while the
participation rates in equation (29) are conditioned on the individual’s current coverage.
67ton (1993), the MSM estimator ˆ θ is both consistent and asymptotically normally distributed:
√
I(ˆ θ − θ0)   N(0,V),
with the variance-covariance matrix V given by
V = (1 + τ)(D′WD)−1D′WSWD(D′WD)−1,




   
   
θ=θ0
(35)
is the 21T × 29 Jacobian matrix of the population moment vector; and W = plim→∞{  WI}.
Moreover, Newey (1985) shows that if the model is properly speciﬁed,
I
1 + τ
ˆ ϕI(ˆ θ,χ0)′R−1 ˆ ϕI(ˆ θ,χ0)   χ2
21T−29,
where R−1 is the generalized inverse of
R = PSP,
P = I − D(D′WD)−1D′W.
The asymptotically eﬃcient weighting matrix arises when   WI converges to S−1, the
inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the data. When W = S−1, V simpliﬁes to
(1 + τ)(D′S−1D)−1, and R is replaced with S. But even though the optimal weighting
matrix is asymptotically eﬃcient, it can be severely biased in small samples. (See, for example,
Altonji and Segal, 1996.) We thus use a “diagonal” weighting matrix, as suggested by Pischke
(1995). The diagonal weighting scheme uses the inverse of the matrix that is the same as S
along the diagonal and has zeros oﬀ the diagonal of the matrix.
We estimate D, S and W with their sample analogs. For example, our estimate of
68S is the 21T × 21T estimated variance-covariance matrix of the sample data. That is, a
typical diagonal element of   SI is the variance estimate 1
I
 I
i=1[1{Ait ≤ Qπj(Ait,t)} − πj]2,
while a typical oﬀ-diagonal element is a covariance. When estimating preferences, we use
sample statistics, so that Qπj(Ait,t) is replaced with the sample quantile   Qπj(Ait,t). When
computing the chi-square statistic and the standard errors, we use model predictions, so
that Qπj is replaced with its simulated counterpart, gπj(t; ˆ θ, ˆ χ). Covariances between asset
quantiles and hours and labor force participation are also simple to compute.
The gradient in equation (35) is straightforward to estimate for hours worked and par-
ticipation conditional upon age and health status; we merely take numerical derivatives of
ˆ ϕI(.). However, in the case of the asset quantiles and labor force participation, discontinu-
ities make the function ˆ ϕI(.) non-diﬀerentiable at certain data points. Therefore, our results
do not follow from the standard GMM approach, but rather the approach for non-smooth
functions described in Pakes and Pollard (1989), Newey and McFadden (1994, section 7) and
Powell (1994). We ﬁnd the asset quantile component of D by rewriting equation (28) as
F(gπj(t;θ0,χ0)|t) − πj = 0,
where F(gπj(t;θ0,χ0)|t) is the c.d.f. of time-t assets evaluated at the πj-th quantile. Diﬀer-




where Djt is the row of D corresponding to the πj-th quantile at year t. In practice we ﬁnd
f(gπj(t;θ0,χ0)|t), the p.d.f. of time-t assets evaluated at the πj-th quantile, with a kernel
density estimator. We use a kernel estimator for GAUSS written by Ruud Koning.
To ﬁnd the component of the matrix D for the asset-conditional labor force participation
69rates, it is helpful to write equation (30) as










− Pr(gπj−1(t;θ0,χ0) ≤ Ait ≤ gπj(t;θ0,χ0)|HI,t)
∂Pj(HI,t;θ0,χ0)
∂θ′
+ [E(Pit|gπj(t;θ0,χ0),HI,t) − Pj(HI,t;θ0,χ0)]f(gπj(t;θ0,χ0)|HI,t)
∂gπj(t;θ0,χ0)
∂θ′










Appendix F: Data and Initial Joint Distribution of the State Variables
Our data are drawn from the HRS, a sample of non-institutionalized individuals aged 51-
61 in 1992. The HRS surveys individuals every two years; we have 7 waves of data covering
the period 1992-2004. We use men in the analysis.
The variables used in our analysis are constructed as follows. Hours of work are the
product of usual hours per week and usual weeks per year. To compute hourly wages, the
respondent is asked about how they are paid, how often they are paid, and how much they
are paid. If the worker is salaried, for example, annual earnings are the product of pay per
period and the number of pay periods per year. The wage is then annual earnings divided by
annual hours. If the worker is hourly, we use his reported hourly wage. We treat a worker’s
hours for the non-survey (e.g. 1993) years as missing.
For survey years the individual is considered in the labor force if he reports working over
300 hours per year. The HRS also asks respondents retrospective questions about their work
history. Because we are particularly interested in labor force participation, we use the work
history to construct a measure of whether the individual worked in non-survey years. For
70example, if an individual withdraws from the labor force between 1992 and 1994, we use the
1994 interview to infer whether the individual was working in 1993.
The HRS has a comprehensive asset measure. It includes the value of housing, other real
estate, autos, liquid assets (which includes money market accounts, savings accounts, T-bills,
etc.), IRAs, stocks, business wealth, bonds, and “other” assets, less the value of debts. For
non-survey years, we assume that assets take on the value reported in the preceding year.
This implies, for example, that we use the 1992 asset level as a proxy for the 1993 asset level.
Given that wealth changes rather slowly over time, these imputations should not severely
bias our results.
To measure health status we use responses to the question: “would you say that your
health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?” We consider the individual in bad health
if he responds “fair” or “poor”, and consider him in good health otherwise.47 We treat the
health status for non-survey years as missing. Appendix G describes how we construct the
health insurance indicator.
We use Social Security Administration earnings histories to construct AIME. Approxi-
mately 74% of our sample released their Social Security Number to the HRS, which allowed
them to be linked to their Social Security earnings histories. For those who did not release
their histories, we use the procedure described below to impute AIME as a function of assets,
health status, health insurance type, labor force participation, and pension type.
The HRS collects pension data from both workers and employers. The HRS asks indi-
viduals about their earnings, tenure, contributions to deﬁned contribution (DC) plans, and
their employers. HRS researchers then ask employers about the pension plans they oﬀer
their employees. If the employer oﬀers diﬀerent plans to diﬀerent employees, the employee is
matched to the plan based on other factors, such as union status. Given tenure, earnings, DC
contributions, and pension plan descriptions, it is then possible to calculate pension wealth
for each individual who reports the ﬁrm he works for. Following Scholz et al. (2006), we use
ﬁrm reports of deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension wealth and individual reports of DC pension
47Bound et al. (2003) consider a more detailed measure of health status.
71wealth if they exist. If not, we use ﬁrm-reported DC wealth and impute DB wealth as a
function of wages, hours, tenure, health insurance type, whether the respondent also has a
DC plan, health status, age, assets, industry and occupation. We discuss the imputation
procedure below.
Workers are asked about two diﬀerent jobs: (1) their current job if working or last job if
not working; (2) the job preceding the one listed in part 1, if the individual worked at that
job for over 5 years. Both of these jobs are included in our measure of pension wealth. Below
we give descriptives for our estimation sample (born 1931-1935) and validation sample (born
1936-1941). 41% of our estimation sample [and 52% of our validation sample] are currently
working and have a pension (of which 56% [57% for the validation sample] have ﬁrm-based
pension details), 6% [5%] are not working, and had a pension on their last job (of which 62%
[62%] have ﬁrm-based pension details), and 32% [32%] of all individuals had a pension on
another job (of which 35% [29%] have ﬁrm-based pension details).
We dropped respondents for the following reasons. First, we drop all individuals who
spent over 5 years working for an employer who did not contribute to Social Security. These
individuals usually work for state governments. We drop these people because they often
have very little in the way of Social Security wealth, but a great deal of pension wealth, a
type of heterogeneity our model is not well suited to handle. Second, we drop respondents
with missing information on health insurance, labor force participation, hours, and assets.
When estimating labor force participation by asset quantile and health insurance for those
born 1931-35 for the estimation sample [and 1936-41 for the validation sample], we begin
with 19,547 [30,890] person year observations. We lose 3,139 [5,227] observations because of
missing participation, 1,930 [2,162] observations who worked over 5 years for ﬁrms that did not
contribute to Social Security, 150 [384] observations due to missing wave 1 participation, and
1,967 [2,883] observations due to missing health insurance data observations due to missing
asset data. In the end, from a potential sample of 19,547 [30,890] person-year observations
for those between ages 51 and 69, we keep 11,773 [19,407] observations.
To generate the initial joint distribution of assets, wages, AIME, pensions, participation,
72health insurance, health status and health costs, we draw random vectors (i.e., random draws
of individuals) from the empirical joint distribution of these variables for individuals aged 57-
61 in 1992, or 1,701 observations. We drop observations with missing data on labor force
participation, health status, insurance, assets, and age. We impute values for observations
with missing wages, health costs, pension wealth, and AIME.
To impute these missing variables, we follow David et al. (1986) and Little (1988) and use
the following predictive mean matching regression approach. First, we regress the variable of
interest yi (e.g., pension wealth) on a vector of observable variables xi, yi = xiβ+ǫi. Second,
we generate a predicted value ˆ yi = xiˆ β and generate a residual εi = yi − ˆ yi for every member
of the sample. Third, we split the predicted value ˆ yi into deciles. Fourth, we impute a value
of yi by taking a residual for a random individual j with a value of ˆ yj that is in the same
decile of the distribution as is ˆ yi. Thus the imputed value of yi is ˆ yi + εj.
As David et al. (1986) point out, our imputation approach is equivalent to hot-decking
when the “x” variables are discretized and include a full set of interactions. The advantages
of the above approach over hot-decking are two-fold. First, many of the “x” variables are
continuous, and it seems unwise to discretize them. Second, we have very few observations for
some variables (such as pension wealth on past jobs), and hot-decking is very data-intensive.
Only a small number of “x” variables are needed to generate a large number of hot-decking
cells, as hot-decking uses a full set of interactions. We found that the interaction terms
are relatively unimportant, but adding extra variables were very important for improving
goodness of ﬁt when imputing pension wealth.
If someone is not working (and thus does not report a wage), we use the wage on their
last job as a proxy for their current wage if it exists, and otherwise impute the log wage
as a function of assets, health, health insurance type, labor force participation, AIME, and
quarters of covered work. We predict medical expenses using assets, health, health insurance
type, labor force participation, AIME, and quarters of covered earnings.
Lastly, we must infer the persistent component of the health cost residual from health
costs. Given an initial distribution of health costs, we construct ζt, the persistent health cost
73component, by ﬁrst ﬁnding the normalized log deviation ψt, as described in equations (7)
and (10), and then applying standard projection formulae to impute ζt from ψt.
Appendix G: Measurement of Health Insurance Type
Much of the identiﬁcation in this paper comes from diﬀerences in medical expenses and job
exit rates between those with tied health insurance coverage and those with retiree coverage.
Unfortunately, identifying these health insurance types is not straightforward. The HRS has
rather detailed questions about health insurance, but the questions asked vary from wave to
wave. Moreover, in no wave are the questions asked consistent with our deﬁnitions of tied
or retiree coverage. Nevertheless, estimated health insurance speciﬁc job exit rates are not
very sensitive of our deﬁnition of health insurance, as we show below.
In all of the HRS waves (but not AHEAD waves 1 and 2), the respondent is asked whether
he has insurance provided by a current or past employer or union, or a spouse’s current or
past employer or union. If he responds yes to this question, we code him as having either
retiree or tied coverage. We assume that this question is answered accurately, so that there
is no measurement error when individual reports that his insurance category is none. All of
the measurement error problems arise when we allocate individuals with employer-provided
coverage between the retiree and tied categories.
If an individual has employer-provided coverage in waves 1 and 2 he is asked “Is this
health insurance available to people who retire?” In waves 3, 4, and 5 the analogous question
is “If you left your current employer now, could you continue this health insurance coverage
up to the age of 65?”. For individuals younger than 65, the question asked in waves 3
through 5 is a more accurate measure of whether the individual has retiree coverage. In
particular, a “yes” response in waves 1 and 2 might mean only that the individual could
acquire COBRA coverage if he left his job, as opposed to full, retiree coverage. Thus the
fraction of individuals younger than 65 who report that they have employer-provided health
insurance but who answer “no” to the follow-up question roughly doubles between waves 2
and 3. On the other hand, for those older than 65, the question used in waves 3, 4, and 5 is
meaningless.
74Our preferred approach to the misreporting problem in waves 1 and 2 is to assume that a
“yes” response in these waves indicates retiree coverage. It is possible, however, to estimate
the probability of mismeasurement in these waves. Consider ﬁrst the problem of distinguish-
ing the retiree and tied types for those younger than 65. As a matter of notation, let HI
denote an individual’s actual health insurance coverage, and let HI∗ denote the measure of
coverage generated by the HRS questions. To simplify the notation, assume that the individ-
ual is known to have employer-provided coverage—HI = tied or HI = retiree—so that we
can drop the conditioning statement in the analysis below. Recall that many individuals who
report retiree coverage in waves 1 and 2 likely have tied coverage. We are therefore interested
in the misreporting probability Pr(HI = tied|HI∗ = retiree,wv < 3,t < 65), where wv
denotes HRS wave and t denotes age. To ﬁnd this quantity, note ﬁrst that by the law of total
probability:
Pr(HI = tied|wv < 3,t < 65) =
Pr(HI = tied|HI∗ = tied,wv < 3,t < 65) × Pr(HI∗ = tied|wv < 3,t < 65) +
Pr(HI = tied|HI∗ = retiree,wv < 3,t < 65) × Pr(HI∗ = retiree|wv < 3,t < 65). (38)
Now assume that all reports of tied coverage in waves 1 and 2 are true:
Pr(HI = tied|HI∗ = tied,wv < 3,t < 65) = 1.
Assume further that for individuals younger than 65 there is no measurement error in waves
3-5, and that the share of individuals with tied coverage is constant across waves:
Pr(HI = tied|wv < 3,t < 65) = Pr(HI = tied|wv ≥ 3,t < 65)
= Pr(HI∗ = tied|wv ≥ 3,t < 65).
Inserting these assumptions into equation (38) and rearranging yields the mismeasurement
75probability:
Pr(HI = tied|HI∗ = retiree,wv < 3,t < 65)
=
Pr(HI∗ = tied|wv ≥ 3,t < 65) − Pr(HI∗ = tied|wv < 3,t < 65)
Pr(HI∗ = retiree|wv < 3,t < 65)
=
Pr(HI∗ = retiree|wv < 3,t < 65) − Pr(HI∗ = retiree|wv ≥ 3,t < 65)
Pr(HI∗ = retiree|wv < 3,t < 65)
. (39)
To estimate the mismeasurement in waves 1 and 2 for those aged 65 and older, we make
the same assumptions as for those who are younger than 65. We assume that all reports of
tied health insurance are true and the probability of having tied health insurance given a
report of retiree insurance is the same as for individuals in waves 1 and 2 who are younger
than 65. We can then use equation (39) to estimate this probability.
The second misreporting problem is that the “follow-up” question in waves 3 through 5
is completely uninformative for those older than 65. Our strategy for handling this problem
is to treat the ﬁrst observed health insurance status for these individuals as their health
insurance status throughout their lives. Since we assume that reports of tied coverage are
accurate, older individuals reporting tied coverage in waves 1 and 2 are assumed to receive
tied coverage in waves 3 through 5. (Recall, however, that if an individual with tied coverage
drops out of the labor market, his health insurance is none for the rest of his life.) For older
individuals reporting retiree coverage in waves 1 and 2, we assume that the misreporting
probability—when we choose to account for it—is the same throughout all waves. (Recall
that our preferred assumption is to assume that a “yes” response to the follow-up question
in waves 1 and 2 indicates retiree coverage.)
A related problem is that individuals’ health insurance reports often change across waves,
in large part because of the misreporting problems just described. Our preferred approach
for handling this problem is classify individuals on the basis of their ﬁrst observed health
insurance report. We also consider the approach of classifying individuals on the basis of
their report from the previous wave, analogous to the practice of using lagged observations
as instruments for mismeasured variables in an instrumental variables regression.
76Figure 9 shows how our treatment of these measurement problems aﬀects measured job
exit rates. The top two graphs in Figure 9 do not adjust for the measurement error problems
described immediately above. The bottom two graphs account for the measurement error
problems, using the approached described by equation 39. The two graphs in the left column
use the ﬁrst observed health insurance report whereas the graphs in the right column use
the previous period’s health insurance report. Figure 9 shows that the proﬁles are not very
sensitive to these changes. Those with retiree coverage tend to exit the labor market at age
62, whereas those with tied and no coverage tend to exit the labor market at age 65.
Another, more conceptual, problem is that the HRS has information on health insurance
outcomes, not choices. This is an important problem for individuals out of the labor force with
no health insurance; it is unclear whether these individuals could have purchased COBRA
coverage but elected not to do so.48 To circumvent this problem we use health insurance in
the previous wave and the transitions implied by equation (10) to predict health insurance
options. For example, if an individual has health insurance that is tied to his job and was
working in the previous wave, that individual’s choice set is tied health insurance and working
or COBRA insurance and not working.49
Another measurement issue is the treatment of the self-employed. Figure 10 shows the
importance of dropping the self-employed on job exit rates. The top panel treats the self-
employed as working, whereas the bottom panel excludes the self-employed. The main diﬀer-
ence caused by dropping the self-employed is that those with no health insurance have much
higher job exit rates at age 65. Nevertheless, those with retiree coverage are still most likely
to exit at age 62 and those with tied and no health insurance are most likely to exit at age
65.
48For example, the model predicts that all HRS respondents younger than 65 who report having tied health
insurance two years before the survey date, work one year before the survey date, and are not currently
working should report having COBRA coverage on the survey date. However, 19% of them report having no
health insurance.
49Note that this particular assumption implies that 100% of those eligible for COBRA take up coverage. In
practice, only about
2
3 of those eligible take up coverage (Gruber and Madrian, 1996). In order to determine
whether our failure to model the COBRA decision is important, we shut down the COBRA option (imposed
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Figure 10: The Effect of Dropping the Self-Employed on Job Exit Rates
79Our preferred speciﬁcation, which we use in the analysis, is to include the self-employed,
to use the ﬁrst observed health insurance report, and to not use the measurement error
corrections.
Because agents in our model are forward-looking, we need to know the health-insurance-
conditional process for health costs facing the very old. The data we use to estimate health
costs for those over age 70 comes from the Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old
survey. French and Jones (2004a) discuss some of the details of the survey, as well as some of
our coding decisions. The main problem with the AHEAD is that there is no question asked
of respondents about whether they would lose their health insurance if they left their job, so
it is not straightforward to distinguish those who have retiree coverage from those with tied
coverage. In order to distinguish these two groups, we do the following. If the individual exits
the labor market during our sample, and has employer-provided health insurance at least one
full year after exiting the labor market, we assume that individual has retiree coverage. All
individuals who have employer-provided coverage when ﬁrst observed, but do not meet this
criteria for having retiree coverage, are assumed to have tied coverage.
Appendix H: The Health Cost Model
Recall from equation (7) that health status, health insurance type, labor force partici-
pation and age aﬀect health costs through the mean shifter hc(.) and the variance shifter
σ(.). Health status enters hc(.) and σ(.) through 0-1 indicators for bad health, and age enters
through linear trends. On the other hand, the eﬀects of Medicare eligibility, health insurance
and labor force participation are almost completely unrestricted, in that we allow for an
almost complete set of interactions between these variables. This implies, for example, that
mean health costs are given by








The one restriction we impose is that γnone,0,a = γnone,1,a for both values of a, i.e., participa-
tion does not aﬀect health care costs if the individual does not have insurance. This implies
80that there are 10 γh,P,a parameters, for a total of 12 parameters apiece in the hc(.) and the
σ(.) functions.
To estimate this model, we group the data into 10-year-age (55-64, 65-74, 75-84) × health
status × health insurance × participation cells. For each of these 60 cells, we calculate both
the mean and the 95th percentile of medical expenses. We estimate the model by ﬁnding
the parameter values that best ﬁt this 120-moment collection. One complication is that the
medical expense model we estimate is an annual model, whereas our data are for medical
expenses over two-year intervals. To overcome this problem, we ﬁrst simulate a panel of
medical expense data at the one-year frequency, using the dynamic parameters from French
and Jones (2004a) shown in Table 2 of this paper and the empirical age distribution. We
then aggregate the simulated data to the two-year frequency; the means and 95th percentiles
of this aggregated data are comparable to the means and 95th percentiles in the HRS. Our
approach is similar to the one used by French and Jones (2004a), who provide a detailed
description.
Appendix I: The Preference Index
We construct the preference index for each member of the sample using the wave 1 vari-
ables V3319, V5009, V9063. All three variables are self-reported responses to questions about
preferences for leisure and work. In V3319 respondents were asked if they agreed with the
statement (if they were working): “Even if I didn’t need the money, I would probably keep
on working.” In V5009 they were asked: “When you think about the time when you [and
your (husband/wife/partner)] will (completely) retire, are you looking forward to it, are you
uneasy about it, or what? In V9063 they were asked (if they were working): “On a scale
where 0 equals dislike a great deal, 10 equals enjoy a great deal, and 5 equals neither like nor
dislike, how much do you enjoy your job?”
Because it is computationally intensive to estimate the parameters of the type probability
equations in our method of simulated moments approach, we combine these three variables
into a single index that is simpler to use. To construct this index, we regress labor force
participation on current state variables (age, wages, assets, health, etc.), squares and interac-
81tions of these terms, the wave 1 variables V3319, V5009, V9063, and indicators for whether
these variables are missing. We then partition the xˆ β matrix from this regression into: x1 ˆ β1,
where the x1 matrix includes V3319, V5009, V9063, and indicators for these variables being
missing; and x2 ˆ β2, where the x2 matrix includes all other variables. Our preference index is
x1 ˆ β1.
Individuals who were not working in 1992 were not asked any of the preference questions,
and are not included in the construction of our index. Because there is no variation in
participation in 1992, we estimate the regression models with participation data from 1998-
2004.
Finally, we discretize the index into three values: out, for those not employed in 1992; low,
for workers with an index in the bottom half of the distribution; and high for the remainder.
Appendix J: Preference Type Prediction Equation
Preference Type 1 Preference Type 2
Parameters Std. Errors Parameters Std. Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Preference Index = out -4.51 0.69 -5.22 18.58
Preference Index = low 3.97 7.25 0.62 4.94
Preference Index = high -0.07 0.46 5.55 0.82
No HI Coverage 1.69 0.67 -4.17 1.28
Retiree Coverage 0.23 0.33 -2.48 0.60
Initial Wages† 2.64 0.46 -0.85 0.45
Assets/Wages† -0.44 0.45 -0.52 0.23
Assets†×(No HI Coverage) 0.20 0.30 1.85 0.82
†Variables expressed as fraction of average
Table 12: Preference type prediction coefficients
82Policy Summary
One of the most important social programs for the rapidly growing elderly population
is Medicare, which provides nearly universal health insurance to individuals that are 65 or
older. In 2005, Medicare had 42.5 million bene¯ciaries and $330 billion of expenditures,
making it only slightly smaller than Social Security.1 Prior to receiving Medicare at age 65,
many individuals receive health insurance only if they continue to work. At age 65, however,
Medicare provides health insurance to almost everyone. Thus an important work incentive
disappears at age 65. An important question, therefore, is whether Medicare signi¯cantly
a®ects the labor supply of the elderly, especially around age 65. This question is particularly
important when considering changes to the Medicare or Social Security programs; the ¯scal
cost of changing the programs depends critically on labor supply responses.
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the e®ect of employer-provided health in-
surance and Medicare in determining retirement behavior. Using data from the Health and
Retirement Study, we estimate the ¯rst dynamic programming model of retirement that
accounts for both saving and uncertain medical expenses. Our results suggest that medi-
cal expense uncertainty and saving are both important for understanding the labor supply
response to Medicare.
We also ¯nd evidence that individuals with stronger preferences for leisure (a greater
dislike of work) gravitate toward jobs that provide health insurance coverage even if they
retire early. Properly accounting for this self-selection reduces the estimated e®ect of health
insurance and Medicare on retirement behavior. In other words, we ¯nd that people with a
desire to retire early appear to choose jobs with health insurance plans that allow them to
retire early.
Nonetheless, we ¯nd that health insurance is an important determinant of retirement|the
Medicare eligibility age is as important for understanding retirement as the Social Security
normal retirement age. For example, shifting forward the Medicare eligibility age from 65
1Figures taken from 2006 Medicare Annual Report (The Boards of Trustees of the Hospital Insurance and
Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds, 2006).
2to 67 would delay retirement by 0.07 years, whereas shifting forward the Social Security
retirement age from 65 to 67 would delay retirement by 0.09 years.
Our work builds upon, and in part reconciles, several earlier studies. Assuming that
individuals value health insurance at the cost paid by employers, Lumsdaine et al. (1994)
and Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) ¯nd that health insurance has a small e®ect on retirement
behavior. One possible reason for their results is that the average employer contribution to
health insurance is modest, and it declines by a relatively small amount after age 65.2 If
individuals are risk-averse, however, and if health insurance allows them to smooth (non-
medical) consumption in the face of volatile medical expenses, they could value employer-
provided health insurance well beyond the cost paid by employers.3
Addressing this point, Rust and Phelan (1997) and Blau and Gilleskie (2006a, 2006b)
estimate models that account explicitly for risk aversion and uncertainty about out-of-pocket
medical expenses. They ¯nd larger labor supply responses to health insurance than those
found in studies that omit medical expense risk. Rust and Phelan and Blau and Gilleskie,
however, assume that an individual's consumption equals his income net of out-of-pocket
medical expenses. In other words, they ignore an individual's ability to smooth consumption
through saving. If individuals can self-insure against medical expense shocks by saving,
prohibiting saving will overstate the consumption volatility caused by medical cost volatility.
It is therefore likely that Rust and Phelan and Blau and Gilleskie overstate the value of health
insurance, and thus the e®ect of health insurance on retirement.4
The ¯rst major contribution of this paper, therefore, is that we construct a life-cycle model
of labor supply that not only accounts for health cost uncertainty and health insurance, but
2Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) ¯nd that the average employer contribution to employee health insurance
is about $2,500 per year before age 65. (Data are from the 1977 NMES, adjusted to 1998 dollars with the
medical component of the CPI.)
3Although individuals without employer-provided coverage can usually buy private health insurance, high
administrative costs and adverse selection problems can make it prohibitively expensive. Moreover, private
coverage often does not cover pre-existing medical conditions, whereas employer-provided coverage typically
does.
4Several empirical studies suggest that self-insurance through saving is important. Smith (1999) ¯nds
that out-of-pocket medical expenses generate large declines in wealth. Cochrane (1991) ¯nds that short-term
illnesses generate only small declines in food consumption.
3also has a saving decision. Moreover, we include the coverage provided by means-tested
social insurance|Medicaid, SSI and other public assistance programs|to account for the
fact that Medicaid provides last-resort health insurance (Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1994,
1995). Including all these features allows us to reconcile some of the divergent ¯ndings of
previous studies. To our knowledge, ours is the ¯rst study of its kind. While van der Klaauw
and Wolpin (2006) also estimate a retirement model that accounts for both savings and
uncertainty, they do not focus on the role of health insurance, and thus use a much simpler
model of health costs.
A key part of our estimation strategy is to compare the behavior of individuals with
di®erent forms of employer-provided health insurance. If access to health insurance is an
important factor in the retirement decision, we should ¯nd that individuals who receive health
insurance only while they work should retire later than individuals who receive employer-
provided health insurance even if they retire early. In making such a comparison, however,
we must account for the possibility that individuals with di®erent health insurance options
di®er along other dimensions as well.
The second major contribution of this paper is that it provides evidence that individuals
with di®erent health insurance plans do di®er signi¯cantly in other ways, both observable and
unobservable. We ¯nd that those with employer-provided post-retirement health insurance
have more generous pension plans, and pension plans that encourage early retirement. We
also allow preferences (tastes) to vary, using an approach common in the literature (see, e.g.,
Keane and Wolpin, 1997). We identify the distribution of preferences using, among other
things, survey responses to questions such as \Even if I didn't need the money, I would keep
on working". We ¯nd that individuals who self report that they would like to leave their
jobs|and in fact are, all else equal, more likely to leave their jobs|are more likely to have
employer-provided health insurance that extends past their retirement. In short, we ¯nd
that those who have post-retirement coverage have stronger preferences for leisure than those
whose health insurance is tied to their job.
4Estimating the model with a technique knows as the Method of Simulated Moments,5 we
¯nd that the model ¯ts the data well with reasonable parameter values. The model predicts
that workers whose health insurance is tied to their job leave the labor force about 0.41 years
later than workers whose coverage extends into retirement. This result, being consistent with
several reduced-form estimates, also supports the model.6
Next, we measure the changes in labor supply induced by raising the Medicare eligibility
age to 67 and by raising the normal Social Security retirement age to 67. We ¯nd that shifting
the Medicare eligibility age to 67 will increase the labor force participation of workers aged
60-67 by an average of 0.9 percentage points a year. Failure to account for di®erences in
preferences results in a larger e®ect. Nevertheless, even after allowing for both savings and
self-selection into health insurance plan, the e®ect of the Medicare eligibility on labor supply
is as large as the e®ect of the Social Security normal retirement age on labor supply.
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